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The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, and its flagship project The New Climate Economy, were set up 
to help governments, businesses and society make better-informed decisions on how to achieve economic prosperity and 
development while also addressing climate change.
The New Climate Economy was commissioned in 2013 by the governments of seven countries: Colombia, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The Commission has operated as an independent 
body and, while benefiting from the support of the seven governments, has been given full freedom to reach its own 
conclusions. 
In September 2014, the Commission published Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report. Since then, 
the project has released a series of country reports on the United States, China, India and Ethiopia, and sector reports  
on cities, land use, energy and finance. It has disseminated its messages by engaging with heads of governments, finance 
ministers, business leaders and other key economic decision-makers in over 30 countries around the world.
The Commission’s programme of work has been conducted by a global partnership of eight leading research institutes: 
World Resources Institute (WRI, Managing Partner), Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), Ethiopian Development Research 
Institute (EDRI), Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations 
(ICRIER), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and Tsinghua University.
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2015 is a year of unprecedented opportunity.  
This year’s landmark intergovernmental conferences –  
the International Conference on Financing for 
Development in Addis Ababa in July, the United 
Nations Summit to adopt the post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals in New York in September, the G20 
Summit in Antalya in November, and the UN Climate 
Change Conference (COP21) in Paris in December – 
have the potential to advance a new era of international 
cooperation which can help countries at all income levels 
build lasting development and economic growth while 
reducing climate risk. 
A goal once seen as distant – to end extreme poverty, 
achieve broad-based prosperity and secure a safe 
climate, all together – is increasingly within reach.  
As the Commission’s 2014 report Better Growth, Better 
Climate argued, crucial investments will be made over the 
next 15 years in the world’s cities, land use and energy 
systems. They have the potential to generate multiple 
benefits for economic growth, human development and 
the environment; or they could lock countries into high-
carbon pathways, with severe economic and climatic 
consequences. Through credible, consistent policies to 
drive resource efficiency, infrastructure investment and 
innovation, both developed and developing countries can 
achieve stronger economic performance and climate goals 
at the same time. This report shows how such actions 
can be scaled up through cooperative, multi-stakeholder 
partnerships – not just between governments, but among 
businesses, investors, states and regions, cities and 
communities.
Technological innovation, new economic trends, and 
new political commitments are now combining to 
build momentum for change. Renewable energy costs 
continue to decline, and energy storage and demand 
management technologies are being developed rapidly, 
creating new opportunities to build cleaner and more 
efficient energy systems and to expand energy access in 
developing countries. Carbon pricing has been adopted 
or is planned in about 40 countries and more than 
20 sub-national jurisdictions, and over 1,000 major 
companies and investors have declared their support 
for it. In the last two years, 28 countries have launched 
efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies, helped recently by 
lower oil prices. Cities are adopting ambitious emission 
reduction and air quality targets and plan to track 
their progress using common standards. Some 175 
governments, companies, indigenous people’s groups 
and civil society organisations have committed to halt 
deforestation by 2030, and leading consumer goods 
and agricultural trading companies are working with 
tropical forest countries and communities to eliminate 
deforestation from their supply chains. International 
finance to support climate resilience and low-carbon 
investment continues to grow; issuances of “green bonds”, 
for example, more than tripled in the last year. And 
companies, investors, governments and financial  
regulators are increasingly integrating climate change  
into their investment and business strategies, creating  
new opportunities and competitive advantage for  
market leaders. 
At the same time, the costs of continuing the current 
fossil fuel-based economic model are becoming ever 
clearer. Air pollution primarily related to fossil fuel- 
based energy and vehicle emissions leads to an estimated 
3.7 million premature deaths globally each year, with 
millions more suffering from respiratory illnesses. Growing 
traffic congestion is causing serious economic costs in 
cities throughout the world, while road traffic accidents 
kill around 1.25 million people annually, over 90% of them 
in developing countries. Volatile oil prices are likely to 
continue, increasing economic uncertainty and delaying 
business investment. As low-carbon energy costs fall and 
climate policy is tightened, locking in high-carbon assets 
increases the risk of future devaluation or stranding. 
Yet action is not yet occurring at the scale or speed 
necessary for structural transformation toward a new 
climate economy. An increasing focus in international 
economic forums on infrastructure for growth, the 
emergence of new development banks and financing 
mechanisms, and historically low interest rates in some 
economies, create a significant opportunity to stimulate 
low-carbon growth in both developing and developed 
countries. But infrastructure investments remain 
inadequate almost everywhere. Performance continues 
to be constrained by the protracted effects of the 
global financial crisis, deeply embedded market failures, 
underlying weaknesses in policies and institutions, and the 
inertia of a longstanding high-carbon economic model. 
While CO
2
 emissions are beginning to decouple 
from growth in both advanced and some emerging 
economies, this process needs to accelerate if we are 
to avoid the worst impacts of climate change on human 
welfare and the global economy. Changes in seasonal 
weather patterns, and the rising costs of more frequent 
extreme weather events such as floods and droughts, are 
already being felt, particularly by the most vulnerable 
developing countries. To hold global warming to under 
2°C, as agreed by the international community, the 
carbon emitted per dollar of GDP in the global economy 
is likely to need to decline by an average of nearly 5% a 
year between now and 2050, compared with the current 
rate of under 1.5%. For developing countries, improving 
emissions intensity allows for strong GDP growth while 
total emissions peak and then ultimately decline.
Executive Summary and Recommendations
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Achieving a new international climate agreement in 
Paris would provide a vital foundation for building 
a lower-carbon and more resilient global economy, 
sending a strong signal to businesses and investors.  
The agreement should include a long-term goal for 
emissions to reach near-zero or below in the second half 
of the century, and a mechanism for regular strengthening 
of commitments. A strong and equitable package of 
support for developing countries is needed, through which 
international public finance mobilises private-sector flows, 
complements strong domestic financial resources, and 
helps enhance institutional and technological capacities.  
The “intended nationally determined contributions” 
(INDCs) that countries are submitting for Paris 
should be as ambitious as possible this year, but 
should be considered as floors rather than ceilings to 
national ambition over the coming years. Many INDCs 
already reflect historically ambitious commitments, but 
collectively it is likely that they will not be enough to 
achieve a 2°C path. As technological change, increased 
financing and multi-stakeholder action and cooperation 
create new low-carbon opportunities at lower cost, 
countries should aim to strengthen their commitments.
This report identifies 10 key areas of opportunity 
for stronger climate action which will also bring 
significant economic benefits. Together, these could 
achieve at least 59% and potentially as much as 96% 
of the emissions reductions needed by 2030 to keep 
global warming under 2°C. Cooperation of multiple 
kinds between governments, city authorities, businesses, 
international organisations and civil society can help 
to realise the full economic benefits of these actions. 
It can scale up technological change, expand markets, 
reduce costs, address concerns about international 
competitiveness, spread best practice and increase the 
flows of finance. 
Multi-stakeholder and international partnerships can 
in this way strengthen current momentum, and help 
drive further economic growth and climate action 
together. The ten areas identified in the report cover the 
three key economic systems where economic growth 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are concentrated 
– cities, land use and energy; the three key drivers of 
growth – resource efficiency, infrastructure investment 
and innovation; action by businesses and investors; 
and three sectors where international cooperation is 
essential – reducing emissions from international aviation 
and shipping, and phasing down hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs). In each area, the report shows how strengthened 
partnerships between multiple stakeholders can catalyse 
significant economic benefits, as well as global emissions 
reductions, and identifies key commitments which can be 
made this year or in 2016. 
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Clean energy financing 
Carbon pricing 
Business 
Aviation and maritime 
HFCs 
Overlap 
Total mitigation impact (mean and full range)
IPCC median emissions needed for 2C pathway
UNEP gross emissions gap
Gt CO2e per year in 2030 
69
3.7
5.7   (4.5 to 6.9) 
4.2  (2.8 to 5.6)
1.9
0.8  (0.6 to 0.9)
1.4 (1.1 to 1.7)
-9.4  (-7.7 to -11.0)
27
42
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Full implementation of the Commission's recommendations could achieve up to 96% of the emissions reductions in 2030 
needed to keep global warming under 2°C.
SOURCE: New Climate Economy, 2015. 
NOTE:
6.2   (3.3 to 9.0) 
6.5   (5.5 to 7.5) 
The emissions reduction potential of the Commission’s recommendations
Note: Bars show mean emissions reduction potential for each field with the full ranges in brackets.
Source: New Climate Economy, 2015. “Estimates of Emissions Reduction Potential for the 2015 Report: Technical Note.” A technical 
note for Seizing the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better Climate. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.
report/misc/working-papers.
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The Commission makes the following 
recommendations:
In the key economic systems where growth and 
emissions are concentrated:
1.  Accelerate low-carbon development in the  
world’s cities
All cities should commit to developing and 
implementing low-carbon urban development 
strategies by 2020, using where possible the 
framework of the Compact of Mayors, prioritising 
policies and investments in public, non-motorised and 
low-emission transport, building efficiency, renewable 
energy and efficient waste management. 
Compact, connected and efficient cities can generate 
stronger growth and job creation, alleviate poverty and 
reduce investment costs, as well as improving quality of 
life through lower air pollution and traffic congestion. 
Better, more resilient models of urban development are 
particularly critical for rapidly urbanizing cities in the 
developing world. International city networks, such as 
the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, ICLEI (Local 
Governments for Sustainability) and United Cities and 
Local Governments (UCLG), are scaling up the sharing 
of best practices and developing initiatives to facilitate 
new flows of finance, enabling more ambitious action on 
climate change. Multilateral development banks, donors 
and others should develop an integrated package of 
at least US$1 billion for technical assistance, capacity 
building and finance to support commitments by the 
world’s largest 500 cities. Altogether, low-carbon 
urban actions available today could generate a stream 
of savings in the period to 2050 with a current value 
of US$16.6 trillion, and could reduce annual GHG 
emissions by 3.7 Gt CO
2
e by 2030. 
2.  Restore and protect agricultural and forest 
landscapes, and increase agricultural productivity
Governments, multilateral and bilateral finance 
institutions, the private sector and willing investors 
should work together to scale up sustainable land 
use financing, towards a global target of halting 
deforestation and putting into restoration at least 
500 million ha of degraded farmlands and forests by 
2030. Developed economies and forested developing 
countries should enter into partnerships that scale up 
international flows for REDD+, focused increasingly 
on mechanisms that generate verified emission 
reductions, with the aim of financing a further 1 Gt 
CO
2
e per year from 2020 and beyond. The private 
sector should commit to extending deforestation- 
free supply chain commitments for key commodities 
and enhanced financing to support this.
Halting deforestation and restoring the estimated 
one-quarter of agricultural lands worldwide which are 
severely degraded can enhance agricultural productivity 
and resilience, strengthen food security, and improve 
livelihoods for agrarian and forest communities in 
developing countries. Developing countries, supported 
by international partnerships between governments, 
the private sector and community organisations, and 
initiatives such as the New York Declaration on Forests, 
REDD+, Initiative 20x20 in Latin America, the Africa 
Climate-Smart Agriculture Alliance and the Global 
Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture, are helping to 
improve enabling environments for forest protection 
and agricultural production, and reducing and sharing 
investment risk to facilitate larger financial flows. The 
Consumer Goods Forum and companies representing 
90% of the global trade in palm oil have committed to 
deforestation-free supply chains by 2020, while major 
commodity traders and consumers are working to widen 
such pledges to other forest commodities. Enhancing 
such partnerships could enable a reduction in annual GHG 
emissions from land use of 3.3-9.0 Gt CO
2
e by 2030.
3.  Invest at least US$1 trillion a year in clean energy
To bring down the costs of financing clean energy and 
catalyse private investment, multilateral and national 
development banks should scale up their collaboration 
with governments and the private sector, and their 
own capital commitments, with the aim of reaching a 
global total of at least US$1 trillion of investment per 
year in low-carbon power supply and (non-transport) 
energy efficiency by 2030. 
The rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy sources and 
energy efficiency is essential to drive global growth, 
connect the estimated 1.3 billion people currently 
lacking access to electricity and the 2.7 billion who lack 
modern cooking facilities, and reduce fossil fuel-related 
air pollution. Increasing international financing for 
energy access is a key priority. International cooperation 
coordinated by development finance institutions is 
helping improve the risk-return profile of clean energy 
projects, particularly for renewables and energy 
efficiency, lowering the cost of capital for investment and 
increasing its supply. It is also starting to drive a shift in 
investments away from new coal-fired power and fossil 
fuel exploration; this needs to be accelerated, starting 
with developed and emerging economies. Scaling up 
clean energy financing to at least US$1 trillion a year  
could reduce annual GHG emissions in 2030 by 5.5- 
7.5 Gt CO
2
e.
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4.  Raise energy efficiency standards to the global best
G20 and other countries should converge their energy 
efficiency standards in key sectors and product 
fields to the global best by 2025, and the G20 should 
establish a global platform for greater alignment and 
continuous improvement of standards. 
Cooperation to raise energy efficiency standards for 
appliances, lighting, vehicles, buildings and industrial 
equipment can unlock energy and cost savings, 
expand global markets, reduce non-tariff barriers to 
trade, and reduce air pollution and GHG emissions. 
Cooperation should be facilitated and supported by 
the G20, empowering existing sectoral initiatives, and 
international organisations such as the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the International Partnership for 
Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), and Sustainable 
Energy for All (SE4All). Globally, enhanced energy 
efficiency investments could boost cumulative economic 
output by US$18 trillion to 2035, increasing growth 
by 0.25–1.1% per year. Aligning and gradually raising 
national efficiency standards could reduce annual  
GHG emissions in 2030 by 4.5–6.9 Gt CO
2
e.
For the key drivers of both economic growth and 
emissions reductions:
5.  Implement effective carbon pricing
All developed and emerging economies, and others 
where possible, should commit to introducing or 
strengthening carbon pricing by 2020, and should 
phase out fossil fuel subsidies. 
Strong, predictable and rising carbon prices send an 
important signal to help guide consumption choices and 
investments in infrastructure and innovation; the fiscal 
revenues generated can be used to support low-income 
households, offset reductions in other taxes, or for other 
policy objectives. An estimated 12% of annual GHG 
emissions are now covered by existing or planned carbon 
taxes or trading systems around the world. Businesses 
are increasingly calling on governments to implement 
carbon pricing, and over 150 now use an internal carbon 
price (typically around US$40/t CO
2
 for oil companies) 
to guide investment decisions. International cooperation 
on carbon pricing and subsidy reform, including 
through the G20 and with the support of the World 
Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), can help mitigate concerns about 
competitiveness impacts from unilateral policy measures, 
improve knowledge-sharing and transparency, provide 
opportunities to link emission trading schemes, and 
reduce the costs of action. 
6.  Ensure new infrastructure is climate-smart
G20 and other countries should adopt key principles 
ensuring the integration of climate risk and climate 
objectives in national infrastructure policies and plans. 
These principles should be included in the G20 Global 
Infrastructure Initiative, as well as used to guide the 
investment strategies of public and private finance 
institutions, particularly multilateral and national 
development banks. 
About US$90 trillion in infrastructure investment is 
needed globally by 2030 to achieve global growth 
expectations, most of it in developing countries. 
Infrastructure investment has become a core focus of 
international economic cooperation through the G20 and 
for established and new development finance institutions. 
Integrating climate objectives into infrastructure 
decisions, often at no or very modest additional cost, 
will increase climate resilience and avoid locking in 
carbon-intensive and polluting investments. International 
finance will have to be significantly scaled up to deliver 
the up-front infrastructure investments needed to 
achieve development and climate goals, including 
increased capitalisation of both national and multilateral 
development banks. 
7.  Galvanise low-carbon innovation 
Emerging and developed country governments 
should work together, and with the private sector 
and developing countries, in strategic partnerships to 
accelerate research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) in low-carbon technology areas critical to 
post-2030 growth and emissions reduction. 
Public funding for low-carbon RD&D is currently too low 
to catalyse innovation for long-term growth and cost-
effective emissions reduction beyond 2030. It should be 
at least tripled by the major economies by the mid-2020s. 
International partnerships enable countries to share the 
costs of innovation, and the knowledge generated by 
it. This can be of particular benefit to low- and middle-
income countries, enabling them to “leapfrog” to new 
technologies and enhance their innovation capacity. 
Priority areas for low-carbon cooperative innovation 
include agriculture and energy access, particularly in 
developing countries; longer-term global solutions such 
as bioenergy and carbon capture, utilisation and storage; 
and key technologies to avoid lock-in of carbon-intensive 
infrastructure, including buildings, electricity networks 
and transport systems. 
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In critical fields of business and finance sector activity:
8.  Drive low-carbon growth through business and 
investor action
All major businesses should adopt short- and long-
term emissions reduction targets and implement 
corresponding action plans, and all major industry 
sectors and value chains should agree on market 
transformation roadmaps, consistent with the long-
term decarbonisation of the global economy.  
Financial sector regulators and shareholders should 
actively encourage  companies and financial institutions 
to disclose critical carbon and environmental, social  
and governance factors, and incorporate them in  
risk analysis, business models and investment 
decision-making.
Businesses are driving a US$5.5 trillion global market 
in low-carbon and environmental technologies and 
products, and many large companies are now cutting 
their emissions, realising significant cost savings and 
often enhancing profitability. Business- and finance 
sector-led initiatives are setting new norms for corporate 
action, including long-term target-setting and the 
integration of climate risk into investors’ analysis and 
strategy. Initiatives such as the Tropical Forest Alliance 
2020 and the Low Carbon Technology Partnerships 
Initiative seek to transform markets in key sectors and 
value chains, driving innovation and creating global 
low-carbon markets. Companies should work with 
governments, unions and other stakeholders to ensure a 
“just transition” to a low-carbon economy, supporting job 
creation, skills development and community renewal. 
For key sectors where international action can unlock 
low-cost emissions reduction:    
9.  Raise ambition to reduce international aviation  
and maritime emissions
Emissions from the international aviation and 
maritime sectors should be reduced in line with a  
2°C pathway through action under the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to implement a 
market-based measure and aircraft efficiency  
standard, and through strong shipping fuel efficiency 
standards under the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).  
Global aviation and shipping together produced about 
5% of global CO
2
 emissions, and by 2050 this is expected 
to rise to 10–32%. Yet they offer some of the most cost-
effective emission reductions available today, particularly 
through improved fuel efficiency. Two new IMO 
standards are expected to save an average of US$200 
billion in annual fuel costs by 2030. Adoption by the 
ICAO in 2016 of a market-based measure (an emissions 
trading or offset scheme) can both cut emissions and 
potentially generate finance for climate action or other 
purposes. This should be complemented by a new 
aircraft standard to ensure emissions reductions within 
the sector. The IMO should adopt a global emissions 
reduction target and promote fuel saving through 
strong operational efficiency standards and a supporting 
data-sharing system. These measures could help reduce 
annual GHG emissions by 0.6–0.9 Gt CO
2
e by 2030. 
10.  Phase down the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 
Parties to the Montreal Protocol should approve an 
amendment to phase down the production and use  
of HFCs. 
Hydrofluorocarbons, used as refrigerants, as solvents, in 
fire protection and in insulating foams, are the fastest-
growing GHGs in much of the world, increasing at a 
rate of 10–15% per year. Replacing HFCs with greener 
refrigerants has low upfront costs and can result in 
both energy and cost savings. Cooperative initiatives 
such as through the Climate and Clean Air Coalition 
to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC), the 
Consumer Goods Forum, and Refrigerants, Naturally! 
are helping countries and companies scale back HFC use. 
Incorporating HFCs into the Montreal Protocol could 
realise significant near-term gains to slow climate change 
and provide support to developing countries, avoiding 
1.1–1.7 Gt CO
2
e of GHG emissions per year by 2030, 
while driving significant energy efficiency improvements.
__________________________________
Implementing these actions will in many cases require 
significant investment. International and national public 
finance will be needed to catalyse and help leverage 
private finance, in particular for low-carbon energy and 
urban development; action to halt deforestation and 
restore degraded land; to build capacity; and to scale 
up research, development and demonstration of clean 
technologies and processes. The economic benefits 
of such investment will be substantial, even without 
consideration of the gains for the climate. 
The Global Commission urges the international 
community to seize the opportunity of the unique 
series of meetings occurring in 2015 to put the world 
on a pathway to low-carbon, climate-resilient growth 
and development. Cooperative action, between 
governments at all levels and with the private sector, 
international organisations and civil society, can help 
achieve both better growth and a better climate. This 
will require strong and sustained political leadership. 
But the prize is immense. Together, a secure, 
prosperous and sustainable future is within our reach.
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This is a time of unprecedented opportunity. In the 
second half of 2015, world leaders will agree on new 
Sustainable Development Goals and how to finance them, 
and negotiate a comprehensive new climate change 
treaty. Technology is advancing rapidly, redefining what 
is possible. New economic trends and opportunities, 
combined with new leadership commitments, have built 
real momentum for change. This was already evident when 
the Global Commission published Better Growth, Better 
Climate last year; it has kept growing since. 
A goal once seen as distant – to end extreme poverty, 
achieve broad-based prosperity and secure a safe climate 
together – is increasingly within reach. More and more 
governments, businesses and communities are actively 
pursuing it. But significant challenges and obstacles still 
stand in the way. 
This report focuses on how international and multi-
stakeholder cooperation can accelerate progress and 
help overcome key barriers. Such cooperation can 
take many different forms: it includes partnerships 
between governments, but also among businesses, 
investors, states and regions, city and local authorities, 
international organisations, civil society organisations 
and communities. Over the last few years many such 
partnerships have emerged. This report identifies some of 
the most promising ones and suggests ways to scale them 
up further. It also identifies areas where new initiatives 
are needed. As such, it provides a menu of options for 
different actors to contribute to delivering both economic 
and climate outcomes. 
Better Growth, Better Climate shows how countries at 
different levels of development can achieve stronger 
economic growth, reduce poverty, advance development 
goals, and reduce climate risk at the same time. It focuses 
on the three major economic systems where growth and 
emissions are concentrated – cities, land use and energy – 
and calls for consistent and credible policies around three 
key drivers of change – resource efficiency, infrastructure 
and innovation (see Box 1). It shows that the economic and 
social benefits alone would make many low-carbon policies 
and approaches worth pursuing. But it also recognises 
that the challenges that countries face in tackling these 
issues are deeply shaped by their history and their political 
and economic circumstances. Low-income countries in 
particular need robust international support to make 
progress on these fronts – and some actions are difficult 
for any country to take on alone. 
Introduction
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This is why international cooperation is so crucial. It is a key 
lever to strengthen and more effectively distribute the flow 
of new ideas and technical capacity. It can mobilise and scale 
up finance, particularly to developing economies. It can help 
overcome concerns about loss of competitiveness, reduce 
trade barriers and increase the scale of markets. By working 
together, countries, businesses, cities and others can move 
faster and achieve greater gains. 
Further international and multi-stakeholder cooperation 
could also significantly enhance and complement the 
ambition of countries’ commitments under the expected 
new climate agreement. The pledges made to date 
(“intended nationally determined contributions”, or 
INDCs) are important steps forward, but it is now clear 
that they are unlikely to add up to a level of emissions 
reduction consistent with keeping global warming under 
the internationally agreed limit of 2°C. The INDCs are 
therefore just a starting point; to avoid even more severe 
impacts on human well-being and economic growth than 
are already expected, ambition will need to rise steadily 
over the next 10–15 years. Cooperative action can make 
that easier and more cost-effective. 
Part 1 of this report outlines some of the major emerging 
developments and trends which are creating new 
opportunities to achieve stronger growth and climate 
action together, as well as continuing challenges. It then 
looks at how stronger international and multi-stakeholder 
cooperation can advance and accelerate progress and 
help tip the balance towards low-carbon global growth. It 
discusses these different forms of cooperation, and places 
them in the context of the international climate negotiations. 
Part 2 then explores 10 areas where there are large, 
immediate opportunities to galvanise such partnerships, 
summarising in-depth analyses set out in a series of  
Working Papers, on which this part is based.
The international meetings taking place in the remainder 
of 20151 – in particular the International Conference on 
Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July, the UN 
Summit to adopt the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals in New York in September, the G20 Summit in 
Antalya in November, and the Paris Climate Change 
Conference (COP21) in December – are critical moments 
for the international community. The world’s leaders must 
rise to the challenge. Failure to seize these opportunities 
would set back the cause of development and poverty 
reduction for years. But success could unleash a new era of 
international cooperation for better growth and a better 
climate. The Commission hopes this report can contribute 
to that success. 
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The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate’s 
2014 report, Better Growth, Better Climate, is addressed to 
economic decision-makers across the world, in both the 
public and private sectors. It examines the large structural 
and technological changes already occurring in the global 
economy, and shows that through targeted policies and 
investments, countries at all levels of development can 
build stronger economies while substantially reducing 
climate risk. 
A key insight of the report is that many of the policy and 
institutional reforms needed for revitalising growth, 
fostering development and improving well-being are 
also crucial to tackle climate risk. The opportunities for 
such reforms are increasing, as emerging and developing 
economies experience rapid urbanisation and structural 
change, innovation reduces the cost of a low-carbon 
transition, and the costs of the current economic growth 
model become more apparent. Many reforms can generate 
multiple economic, social and environmental benefits: 
improved economic performance and faster poverty 
reduction, as well as cleaner air, more liveable and  
vibrant cities, and greater resilience to climate change. 
The report examines three key drivers of change: 
efficiency of resource use, infrastructure investment, and 
innovation. All three offer potential for both improving 
growth and reducing climate risk. Progress will be 
especially important in three key socio-economic systems 
that underpin a large share of the world’s economic 
activity and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: cities, 
land use, and energy. Credible and consistent policies 
are needed in each, taking into account the unique 
circumstances, varying capacities and differing needs  
of countries at different levels of development. 
Cities and urban areas are home to half the world’s 
population, and account for about 80% of global economic 
output and around 70% of global energy use and 
energy-related GHG emissions. Nearly all of the world’s 
population growth in the next two decades will occur in 
urban areas, primarily in developing countries; by 2050, 
two-thirds of the global population will be urban. How 
cities develop is thus critical to the future path of the 
world economy, development and climate. A large share of 
urban growth today involves unmanaged sprawl, leading to 
congestion, rising air pollution, and high economic, social 
and environmental costs overall. As discussed in Section 
2.1 of this report, pioneering cities around the world are 
demonstrating the benefits of a different approach: more 
Box 1
Better Growth, Better Climate – Key Insights
compact, connected and efficient urban forms built around 
mass transit. Adopting this model not only leads to more 
attractive and competitive cities, but higher quality of life, 
sustained resource savings and lower GHG emissions. 
Land use is a key development concern, as roughly a quarter 
of the world’s agricultural land is severely degraded, and 
forests continue to be cleared for conversion to crops and 
pasture, and for timber and mining. Key ecosystem services 
are being compromised, and the natural resource base is 
becoming less productive. Yet by 2050, the world’s farms 
will need to produce 70% more calories than in 2006, due to 
population growth, rising incomes and changing diets. There 
is considerable scope to increase agricultural productivity 
and resilience through new methods of crop and livestock 
management and the restoration of degraded land, and at 
the same time to reduce the estimated 25% of food that is 
wasted globally. Better Growth, Better Climate recommends 
international cooperation to restore 500 million hectares 
of degraded forests and agricultural land through scaled-up 
investment and adoption of landscape-level approaches. 
It also recommends a scale-up of programmes to protect 
and restore forests, including reaching at least US$5 billion 
investment in REDD+ financing per year. Section 2.2 of  
this report highlights recent initiatives that can help to 
deliver this. 
Energy use has grown by more than 50% since 1990. 
Energy services will need to keep rising rapidly to support 
continued development and bring modern energy access 
to the 1.3 billion people who lack access to electricity and 
the 2.7 billion who lack modern cooking facilities, mostly 
in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Energy production 
and use already account for two-thirds of global GHG 
emissions, so how this new demand is met is a crucial 
determinant of climate risk. Better Growth, Better Climate 
stresses the need to sharply boost energy efficiency, 
encouraging governments to treat it as the “first fuel” –  
a topic discussed further in Section 2.4 of this report. It 
also urges an expansion of low-carbon energy production, 
particularly renewables, noting their falling costs and  
the benefits to energy security, air quality and public 
health. And it calls for an end to new unabated fossil 
fuel power: in developed countries immediately, and in 
emerging economies by 2025, while acknowledging the 
specific needs of lower-income countries. Energy  
markets and financing methods also need to be adapted  
to accommodate renewables at scale; this is discussed  
in Section 2.3. 
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Cutting across and shaping these three socio-economic 
systems are three major drivers of change:
Resource efficiency is essential for achieving both better 
growth and emissions reduction. There are numerous 
opportunities to boost efficiency in the use of energy, 
water, land, capital and other crucial resources through 
reforms to tackle market failures and poor policies. Better 
Growth, Better Climate recommends that governments 
introduce strong, predictable and rising carbon prices as 
part of fiscal reform strategies, prioritising the use of the 
revenues to offset impacts on low-income households 
or to finance reductions in other, distortionary taxes. 
Effective policies will need to be tailored to each country’s 
circumstances. As discussed in Section 2.5, there has been 
considerable momentum towards both carbon pricing 
and fossil fuel subsidy reform in the last two years. In 
rural areas water, fertiliser and power subsidy reforms 
are likewise needed to encourage more efficient and 
sustainable agricultural practices. 
Infrastructure investment – in transport networks, 
power plants and transmission systems, buildings, water 
and telecommunication systems – is a crucial driver 
of development, providing critical services and raising 
the overall productivity of the economy. The nature of 
infrastructure investment will also determine to a great 
extent whether economies can shift to a low-carbon 
path or are locked into high levels of fossil fuel use and 
inefficient, sprawling cities. The global economy will 
require about US$90 trillion in infrastructure investments 
by 2030 across cities, land use and energy systems, much 
of this in developing countries. A low-carbon transition 
will require a shift in the allocation of this investment, with 
perhaps a 5% increase in upfront capital needs – about 
US$270 billion per year. These higher capital costs could 
potentially be fully offset by lower operating costs, such 
as from reduced expenditure on fuel. Section 2.6 examines 
how infrastructure planning can be made both more 
resilient to climate impacts and compatible with climate 
mitigation goals. 
Innovation is central to economic growth and 
productivity. Innovation, and the rapid diffusion of 
clean technologies between countries, is also essential 
to achieve low-carbon development models, making it 
possible to continue economic growth in a world of finite 
resources. Advances in materials science, digitisation, the 
circular economy and business models are now reshaping 
industrial production, and creating opportunities for 
developing countries to “leapfrog” over less efficient, 
more polluting stages of development. Better Growth, 
Better Climate argues that public support for energy 
research and development (R&D) should be at least 
tripled in major economies by the mid-2020s, to well 
over US$100 billion per year. It also encourages the use 
of pricing mechanisms, regulatory standards and public 
procurement to create market “pull” for low-carbon 
technologies. Section 2.7 highlights key areas where 
international partnerships to share costs and knowledge 
could greatly enhance national efforts, particularly to 
support growth and emissions reduction in emerging  
and developing countries.  
By pursuing these approaches, Better Growth, Better 
Climate argues that economic growth, development and 
climate outcomes can be achieved at the same time: 
though some trade-offs may inevitably have to be made, 
countries need not choose between them. The multiple 
benefits of climate action include reductions in the 
health impacts of air pollution, in traffic congestion and 
accidents; lower risk of locking in stranded assets; less 
vulnerability to volatile fossil fuel prices and potential 
fuel supply disruptions; enhanced productivity of 
agricultural and forested lands, and associated increases 
in rural income; as well as the benefits of reduced climate 
impacts. In terms of air pollution, for example, fossil fuel-
related outdoor air pollution leads to an estimated 3.7 
million premature deaths globally each year, with millions 
more suffering from respiratory illnesses. 
Yet Better Growth, Better Climate also stresses that shifting 
to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economic pathway will 
not be easy, and will entail additional investment in the 
short-term. Not all climate policies are win-win, and some 
sectors and businesses will lose out, even where there 
are overall net gains to the economy. Governments will 
need to commit to a “just transition”, providing support 
for displaced workers, affected communities and low-
income households. And the mix of policies used will need 
to be adjusted to suit different country circumstances. 
Strong political leadership and the active engagement 
of civil society and business will be crucial. Broad 
international cooperation is also vital, particularly to 
support developing countries in moving towards a lower-
carbon and more climate-resilient growth model. A new 
international climate agreement, including robust financial 
commitments, is essential to lay a strong foundation for 
ambitious action in countries at all levels of development.
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PART I: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR LOW-CARBON GROWTH 
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
1.1  Recent trends and developments 
The world is changing before our eyes. As discussed 
in Better Growth, Better Climate, new patterns of 
international production and trade, demographic change 
and technological advances have dramatically altered the 
shape of the global economy over the last two decades. 
“Business as usual” is no longer an option. Structural 
change is inevitable – but that change can be steered to 
make economies at all levels of development stronger, 
more equitable, more sustainable and more resilient. 
Several emerging trends and developments offer new 
opportunities to accelerate the transition to low-carbon 
growth and prosperity. In this section we highlight six: 
rapid innovation and declining costs of clean energy 
technologies; the fall in oil prices as an opportunity to 
advance carbon pricing and fossil fuel subsidy reform; 
growing international attention to infrastructure 
investment, particularly in the context of low interest 
rates; heightened awareness of climate risks in the 
financial sector; rising interest in low-carbon growth 
pathways in emerging and developing economies; and  
an acceleration of the decline in the carbon intensity of  
the global economy. 
These trends and developments are happening at all 
levels, from the global, to the regional and to the local. 
They are being spurred by leading companies, major cities 
and enlightened governments. None is decisive in itself, 
and in each case, major barriers and challenges still need 
to be overcome to achieve large-scale and lasting change. 
But as discussed in Section 1.2, international and multi-
stakeholder cooperation can play a key role in helping 
overcome these challenges.
Rapid growth and record low prices for clean 
energy and energy storage technologies 
In November 2014, a new price benchmark for solar 
photovoltaics (PV) was set in Dubai: a bid of just under 
US$60 per MWh in response to a tender from the state 
utility DEWA.2 These are record lows, reflecting a global 
fall in the cost of solar power systems by 75% since 2000, 
while that of energy storage has fallen by 60% since 
2005 alone.3 In a wide range of geographies, utility-scale 
solar PV is being procured for about US$80/MWh.4 This 
corresponds to natural gas prices in the range of US$7–10 
mmbtu – still higher than the US$2–3/mmbtu seen in the 
shale-rich US in early 2015, but lower than the US$9–10/
mmbtu prevailing in Germany and US$14–15 mmbtu in 
Japan.5 This means that in an ever-growing number of 
countries, solar PV is now competitive with fossil fuels.  
A similar story can be told for wind power.6
As a result of these falling costs, every dollar invested in 
renewables buys more capacity than ever: the US$270 
billion invested in 2014 bought 36% more capacity than 
the US$279 billion invested in 2011.7 Experts predict that 
a further rise in the competitiveness of renewable energy 
is now only a few years away as a result of plunging energy 
storage costs. The recent emergence of advanced low-
cost batteries for homes, industry and utilities,8 along with 
the rapid development of smart systems using digital and 
information technologies, is enabling the sophisticated 
management of demand at every level from the grid as a 
whole to individual homes. Radical new energy business 
models are now in prospect, with the potential to lead to  
a step-change in overall energy productivity.9 
One result of these trends is that the share of new 
renewables (excluding hydropower) in electricity 
generation worldwide is rising – from 8.5% in 2013 to 
9.1% in 2014, when renewables contributed  48% of the 
world’s newly-added generating capacity (see Figure 1).10 
It is still not enough, but almost everywhere in the world 
renewable investment is growing rapidly. 
Yet investment in fossil fuels also continues: in 2014, more 
than 1,300 GW of coal-fired capacity was in construction 
or pre-construction stages around the world, and major 
investments are being made in new sources of oil and 
gas.11 At the current rate of increase of about 0.6–0.7 
percentage points a year, the share of renewables in total 
electricity generation would still only reach 20% by 2030 
– considerably less than the 41% which the IEA suggests 
is needed to hold global warming to under 2°C.12 The 
speed of change is inhibited by several factors: continuing 
challenges raising the financing needed to invest in 
renewables; the difficulty of reforming energy markets 
and regulatory arrangements to enable the integration 
of intermittent renewables into electricity systems at 
scale; and continuing fossil fuel subsidies and weak 
or absent carbon prices, which keep fossil fuel energy 
prices artificially low. But in turn these challenges are 
spurring new efforts at overcoming them, in both national 
policymaking in many countries and through various forms 
of international cooperation. We discuss these below 
and in Section 2.3. 
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A plunge in oil prices – and a chance to 
accelerate energy price reforms 
Global oil prices fell by half between the middle and end 
of 2014 (Figure 2). At first sight, this might not seem like 
an opportunity for lower-carbon growth. In fact, it has 
raised demand for oil and gas to some extent. However, 
lower oil prices have also created an opportunity to 
pursue much-needed policy reforms. Low prices make 
it easier in particular for governments to reform fossil 
fuel consumption subsidies and adopt more efficient 
frameworks for energy taxation, while still keeping fuel 
prices affordable. 
It is unclear how long this opportunity will last. There 
are multiple causes for the recent fall in prices, including 
the growth in unconventional sources such as shale oil, 
sluggish world demand, changes in the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price 
determination policy and a stronger US dollar. Empirical 
analysis suggests that supply factors played the biggest 
part in the recent price drop.14 Modelling suggests that the 
oil price decline may increase global GDP by 0.3–0.7% in 
2015, and by 0.2–0.8% in 2016.15 However, there is little 
consensus on the medium-term direction of oil prices, and 
price predictions are in any case frequently inaccurate. 
What can be said is that large swings in the oil price of 
25–50% over a short period are quite common, and such 
volatility is likely to continue. Volatility and the increased 
uncertainty it brings are economically harmful in their own 
right, delaying business investment and requiring costly 
reallocation of resources.16 
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Initially, there were understandable fears that the drop 
in oil prices might halt the rising demand for alternatives 
to fossil fuels, such as improved energy efficiency, 
renewables and electric vehicles. But this now looks 
unlikely, given the momentum of innovation and falling 
costs in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Indeed, 
greater energy efficiency and reliance on clean energy 
will provide an important hedge against the risk of higher 
oil prices in the future. Nevertheless, countries may need 
to adjust their support for clean energy in the near-term 
to ensure that its long-term benefits are not disrupted 
by the near-term decline in oil prices.18 Enhancing 
international efforts to bring down the cost of capital 
for renewable energy and raising energy efficiency 
standards, as we discuss in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, will be 
particularly important. 
A number of countries are taking advantage of the low 
oil prices to accelerate fossil fuel consumption subsidy 
reforms and the adoption of carbon pricing through 
carbon emission trading schemes (ETS) or carbon taxes. 
These reforms can help offset the near-term incentives 
for more fossil fuel consumption created by low oil 
prices, while yielding important long-term benefits 
for economic efficiency, energy security, government 
budgets, cleaner air and reduced climate risk, especially 
given the high volatility and uncertainty of oil prices 
in the future.19 With the right approach and flanking 
policies to address social impacts, these reforms can be 
maintained even if oil prices increase. This is discussed 
further in Section 2.5.
As of 2015, about 40 countries and 20 sub-national 
jurisdictions representing almost a quarter of global 
GHG emissions have explicit carbon pricing policies in 
place or planned.20 Taken together, the carbon pricing 
instruments in these jurisdictions currently cover about 
half of their GHG emissions, equivalent to 7 Gt CO
2
e, 
or about 12% of global GHG emissions – triple the 4% 
covered in 2005. Important recent developments include 
the successful operationalization of pilot trading schemes 
in seven cities and regions in China, with a national ETS 
to be launched in 2016; the introduction of Korea’s ETS 
in 2015; and the successful linking and expanding of 
the regional trading schemes in California and Quebec 
in 2014. They will be joined this year by Ontario.21 
Chile and Portugal have adopted carbon taxes, and 
South Africa plans to introduce one in 2016. India has 
increased excise taxes on diesel and petrol, representing 
an increase in implicit carbon prices. 
It is clear that these reforms, while nationally 
determined, are mutually reinforcing, each making 
it easier for others to be introduced, as fears over 
competitiveness impacts are reduced and a sense of a 
“new policy normal” is created. As we note in Section 
2.5, the various international initiatives now under way 
to build political support for carbon pricing, including 
among businesses, have the potential to expand its use 
much further. 
Fossil fuel consumption subsidies in emerging and 
developing economies totalled US$548 billion in 
2013, while fossil fuel exploration, production and 
consumption subsidies in OECD countries amount 
to US$55–90 billion a year.22 But some 28 countries 
are now undertaking energy subsidy reforms, with 
reductions in consumer subsidies in countries such as 
Mexico, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, and India. Several 
others are considering additional steps, including 
Morocco and Jordan.23 Lower oil prices have made this 
easier, though the political challenges remain formidable. 
In terms of production and exploration subsidies, low 
oil prices have, if anything, increased the pressure to 
maintain support. What countries undertaking reforms 
have almost all found, however, is that, while fossil fuel 
consumption subsidies are often introduced as a form of 
social protection, they are in practice regressive, with the 
richest 20% of the population typically capturing 40–
50% of subsidy benefits, while the poorest 20% usually 
get much less than 10%.24 Well-targeted cash transfers 
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provide more effective and efficient social protection 
for the poor, and many countries are now benefiting 
from the learning of others as policy practice spreads 
internationally (see Section 2.5).
A growing interest in new infrastructure 
investment and finance 
Infrastructure investment has risen to prominence 
on the international economic agenda in recent years. 
At its Brisbane Summit in 2014 the G20 established 
a new Global Infrastructure Initiative, along with 
an implementing “Infrastructure Hub”, with the aim 
of catalysing both public and private investment.25 
Around the same time, the World Bank launched a 
Global Infrastructure Facility with other multilateral 
development banks and private sector investors to 
help deliver major infrastructure projects in low- and 
middle-income countries.26 New multilateral and national 
development banks are being established with a specific 
infrastructure focus, notably the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank27 and the New Development Bank.28 
There is increasing interest in catalysing private 
financing of new infrastructure, particularly among 
institutional investors such as pension funds and 
insurance companies.29 This is also a growing focus 
of the international discussions around Financing for 
Development, as we discuss below.30 
Better Growth, Better Climate estimates that the world  
will need some US$90 trillion of infrastructure 
investment in 2015–30 (an average of US$6 trillion 
a year), concentrated in cities, energy and land 
use systems. But it points out that the choice of 
infrastructure is critical. Many forms of infrastructure, 
including roads, public transport systems, power plants, 
water management systems and urban buildings make 
significant contributions to GHG emissions, and they 
are also particularly vulnerable to the rising incidence 
of extreme weather events. If long-lived investments 
are made without attention to wider impacts, such as 
on energy security, air pollution, GHG emissions and 
resilience to climate damage, the world will become 
locked into a carbon-intensive development path with 
severe risks to both growth and climate. Building low-
carbon infrastructure would require not much more 
capital, perhaps an additional US$4 trillion of investment 
(around 5% more), and this could well be largely or 
completely offset by longer term operational savings  
on fossil fuel costs. 
Extremely low long-term real interest rates in many 
advanced economies provide an extraordinarily 
favourable financing environment for infrastructure 
investment. In March 2015 the real interest rate on 
10-year US government borrowings was less than 0.3% 
(as reflected in yields on inflation protected securities). 
In Germany and Japan the nominal yields on 10-year 
government bonds were below 1% (Figure 3), which, 
given inflation expectations, constitute effectively zero 
or negative real interest rates. Given the likelihood that 
interest rates will rise over coming years, this presents a 
major and probably time-limited opportunity to finance 
new infrastructure at very low cost.31 
Increasing investment in infrastructure is a powerful 
way to boost global economic growth, which remains 
mediocre. It can stimulate short-term demand in 
economies where it is weak, and ease supply bottlenecks 
and expand potential output elsewhere. Recent estimates 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate 
sizeable and long-lasting impacts of public infrastructure 
spending on private investment and output. These effects 
are significantly larger during periods of slow growth and 
in countries with high public investment efficiency, which 
is critical to ensure that resources are not squandered 
on “white elephant” projects. Other studies document 
the impact of infrastructure in reducing poverty and 
distributional inequity in developing countries.32 Given 
the critical need to replace old and often crumbling 
infrastructure in the developed world, and the huge 
deficit in infrastructure spending in most developing 
countries, this creates a major opportunity to drive 
global growth. But it has to be “climate-smart” – both 
low-carbon and climate-resilient. As we discuss in 
Section 2.6, it would be extremely short-sighted to build 
infrastructure which is immediately vulnerable to climate 
change impacts and/or to more stringent climate policy  
in the future. 
20 www.newclimateeconomy.report
The low real interest rates that advanced economies 
are enjoying are not being seen in most developing 
countries, which continue to face significantly higher 
market borrowing costs or are excluded from international 
capital markets altogether. Thus a major priority is to 
strengthen international collaboration on expanding the 
flow of climate-smart infrastructure finance to developing 
countries, as well as to tackle specific institutional and 
policy problems and uncertainties that inhibit private 
infrastructure investment.34 These efforts should include 
technical and other assistance to help low-income 
countries strengthen their public investment management 
frameworks and capacities.35 
Heightened attention to climate risks – and 
opportunities – in the financial sector
There is growing interest in climate risk within the 
financial sector. This is perhaps unsurprising in the 
global insurance industry, where climate risk is now 
widely integrated into both underwriting products and 
investment strategies. To increase risk transparency, the 
industry has embarked on a “1 in 100” initiative to develop 
climate risk metrics for one-in-100-year catastrophic 
events to be applied across private and public sector 
actors.36 In the US, insurance regulators in several major 
states are implementing an annual Insurer Climate 
Risk Disclosure Survey.37 But action is now spreading. 
Central banks, financial sector regulators, capital market 
authorities and finance ministries are also now beginning 
to include consideration of climate risks in the rules 
governing financial systems. The aim is to send clearer 
signals to financial markets, better aligning incentives for 
private investors with the true social cost of investment  
in fossil fuels and the benefits of clean investments. 
The Bank of England, for example, is studying the impact 
of climate risks on the UK financial system, including 
both physical risks (such as catastrophic weather events) 
and transitional risks (related to the speed of transition 
to a low-carbon economy), while the Bank’s Prudential 
Regulation Authority is reviewing the implications 
of climate change for the safety and soundness of 
insurance companies. Brazil’s Central Bank has issued 
requirements for all banks to introduce systems for 
assessment of climate and other socio-environmental 
risks. A small but growing number of countries now have 
legal requirements for institutional investors to report 
on how their investment policies and performance are 
affected by environmental factors, including South Africa 
and, prospectively, the EU.38 Concern about the risks of a 
“carbon bubble” – that highly valued fossil fuel assets and 
investments could be devalued or “stranded” under future, 
more stringent climate policies – prompted G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in April 2015 to 
ask the Financial Stability Board in Basel to convene an 
inquiry into how the financial sector can take account of 
climate-related issues.39 
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Investors more generally are starting to become engaged. 
Following the passage of shareholder resolutions requiring 
BP and Shell to disclose their climate risks and strategies 
in spring 2015,40 62 institutional investors representing 
nearly US$2 trillion in assets called on the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission to push for better disclosure of 
such risks by oil and gas companies in general.41 Others are 
now divesting from fossil fuel assets, particularly coal. Over 
the past three years more than 220 institutions, including 
colleges and universities, cities, religious institutions, 
pension funds, foundations and others have committed 
to such divestment.42 In May 2015, Norway’s sovereign 
wealth fund, one of the top 10 investors in the global coal 
industry, announced it would withdraw up to US$10 billion 
of investment from companies heavily reliant on coal.43 
At the same time as attention to climate risk has been 
rising, there has also been increasing concern to ensure 
that financial systems are adequately structured to 
invest in the low-carbon economy. The UN Environment 
Programme’s Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable 
Financial System is conducting a two-year examination 
with the support of central banks and financial regulators 
across the world.44 China is already working on a 
comprehensive framework for a “green financial system”, 
including strengthening legal frameworks, improving 
information, increasing fiscal and financial policy incentives 
and developing its national development banks as leaders 
in green finance.45 
Countries and jurisdictions such as Brazil, China, the 
European Union and India are also reforming regulations 
and incentives in order to promote the development of 
markets for “green bonds” and other investment vehicles 
for environmental and low-carbon infrastructure and 
assets. Issuances of green bonds (corporate, municipal 
or institutional bonds with proceeds earmarked for an 
environmentally-friendly project, or project bonds issued 
specifically with the backing of clean energy projects) 
have grown rapidly in recent years, from less than US$5 
billion per year in 2007–12 to US$11 billion in 2013 and 
US$37 billion in 2014. Other investment vehicles are also 
expanding rapidly. In just two years, 15 “YieldCos” (publicly-
traded companies paying dividends to shareholders from 
portfolios of owned renewable energy projects) have been 
set up in the US, Canada and Europe, with a total market 
capitalization of well over US$20 billion.46 Several major 
global banks have made public commitments to increasing 
their investments in environmental and climate-related 
projects, including Bank of America and Citigroup.47 
These are positive trends, yet they remain small relative 
to total global financial flows. There is thus great scope to 
scale up international financial initiatives to increase the 
capital allocated to low-carbon investment. We discuss  
this further in Section 2.3. 
National development strategies are 
integrating green growth and climate resilience
A growing number of developing and emerging economies 
are building “green growth” and environmental 
sustainability into their national development and poverty 
reduction strategies. This reflects a recognition that 
countries in a wide range of economic circumstances can 
achieve their development goals through more sustainable 
approaches than others have pursued in the past.48 
Rwanda, for example, a least developed country, adopted 
a Green Growth and Climate Resilience Strategy in 2011, 
aiming to mainstream climate goals into its economic 
development and poverty reduction plans. It aims for 
Rwanda to become a developed country by 2050, 
based on its renewable energy resources, particularly 
geothermal; integrated soil fertility management in its 
agricultural sector; and the development of high-density, 
“walkable” cities.49 
Ethiopia, another least developed country, adopted a 
Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Initiative 
as part of its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 
for 2010–25.50 It seeks to secure “triple wins”: 
simultaneously raising productivity, strengthening climate 
resilience and reducing GHG emissions, and tries to 
address trade-offs between these objectives. It includes 
initiatives to disseminate efficient cookstoves, and to 
introduce new soil management methods and agricultural 
technologies to raise yields and reduce emissions 
from agriculture, which will also reduce deforestation 
pressures. At the same time, as part of the drive to 
achieve middle-income status by 2025, the GTP aims 
to dramatically increase power generation capacity and 
energy access by exploiting the country’s considerable 
renewable power potential, through hydroelectric power, 
wind, geothermal and biofuels. 
Increasing energy production to achieve universal access 
and also support economic growth is a key development 
challenge for almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
and for several in Asia, including India. In its 2015 
report, the independent African Progress Panel led by 
Kofi Annan argues that the huge need to expand energy 
production in Africa will inevitably require continuing use 
of fossil fuels, including coal.51 But the report also finds 
that Africa could “leapfrog” over the fossil fuel-based 
growth paths of developed countries and should aim to 
become a leader in low-carbon development, exploiting 
its abundant – and still barely utilised – renewable energy 
resources. This would require a significant increase in 
energy investment, amounting to around 3.4% of Africa’s 
GDP. Countries such as Brazil have shown how energy 
supply can be increased rapidly; others such as Kenya and 
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Bangladesh are pioneering new approaches to financing 
decentralised solar power.52 For example, Grameen Shakti 
operates a microcredit model that has financed more 
than 220,000 solar home systems and 30,000 energy-
efficient cookstoves in Bangladesh.53 But achieving the 
UN goal of universal access to energy by 2030 will require 
the support of the international community, including a 
significant scaling-up of finance and technical assistance. 
We discuss this further in Section 1.3. 
China offers perhaps the most striking example of new 
policies. It has now embarked on a historic structural 
transformation that has global implications: both directly, 
because of China's role in the world economy, and 
indirectly, by the lessons it provides to other developing 
countries. China is moving away from a development 
model based on rapid growth in capital accumulation and 
energy-intensive export industries, powered largely by 
coal. It is seeking to move towards an economy based 
on growth in domestic consumption and services, with 
stronger innovation and more efficient resource use, 
powered increasingly by cleaner forms of energy. At 
the same time it is trying to reverse old patterns of 
urbanisation, which resulted in sprawl and rising air 
pollution. China’s leaders have listed what they describe 
as building an “ecological civilisation” as one of the 
country’s five top priorities guiding reforms. Severe air 
pollution is a key driver. In September 2013 China banned 
construction of new conventional coal-fired power 
plants in major economic areas, and in 2014 it instituted 
a national cap on coal consumption. Coal consumption 
in 2013–14 is estimated to have grown by only 0.1%, 
and may now have peaked.54 At the same time, strong 
measures are being implemented to promote energy 
efficiency and expand nuclear, hydro, solar and wind 
power generation;  China now has the most installed wind 
power and second most solar PV in the world.55 Among 
the seven “strategic emerging industries” prioritised for 
economic growth in the government’s 12th Five Year Plan 
(2011–16), five are environmental sectors, including new 
energy sources, energy conservation and clean vehicles.56 
China remains heavily coal-dependent, and its global 
growth is a major source of rising GHG emissions, but this 
is a serious shift in the form of its economic development. 
These examples – and others in very different contexts, 
such as in Colombia, Costa Rica, South Korea and 
Indonesia – are indicative of a more widespread shift in 
the understanding of development paths. An increasing 
number of developing and emerging economies are 
coming to view environmental sustainability and climate 
action as integral elements of their growth strategies. But 
international cooperation – through increased flows of 
knowledge, financing and other resources – will for most 
developing countries be critical if these strategies are to 
be realised.57 
The carbon intensity of the global economy  
is falling 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that 
global CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuel combustion held 
steady at about 32 Gt in 2014, the first time in 40 years 
that a halt or reduction in global emissions has not 
been associated with an economic crisis.58 Global GDP, 
meanwhile, grew by just over 3%. This means that the CO
2 
intensity of global GDP also fell by just over 3%. Examining 
these trends and future options, the IEA observes that, 
while definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from a single 
year, there are now positive signs that climate change 
mitigation efforts have the potential to decouple growth 
from emissions over the coming period.59 
Although detailed information is not yet fully available, 
the slowdown in China’s coal consumption and CO
2
 
emissions in 2014 appear to have been an important 
contributor to the apparent halt in global emissions 
growth, the result of strong policies to reduce air 
pollution, curb coal use, promote energy efficiency and 
expand low-carbon power generation capacity.60 Efforts 
to increase carbon pricing, boost energy efficiency and 
shift to renewable energy are also helping to decouple 
CO
2
 emissions from growth in both advanced and a 
range of emerging and developing economies. The 
reduction in the CO
2
 intensity of global GDP adds to 
the growing body of evidence that countries can reduce 
GHG emissions while sustaining economic growth. 
However, climate risk is still rising. The level of emissions 
remains extremely high, and it is still too early to conclude 
that it has stabilised. The IEA’s 2 degrees scenario (2DS) 
– defined as an emission pathway which gives at least 
a 50% chance to keep the mean temperature increase 
below 2°C – provides a measure of the challenge ahead. 
The specific pathway explored by the IEA would entail 
reducing CO
2
 emissions from energy consumption by 
almost 60% to reach 14 Gt CO
2
 by 2050, with a decline to 
zero net emissions in the second half of the century. To get 
there, the IEA estimates that the world energy-intensity 
of GDP (broadly reflecting energy efficiency) and the 
carbon-intensity of primary energy consumption (broadly 
reflecting the share of fossil fuels in the energy mix) would 
both need to fall by 60% from 2012 to 2050, or by around 
2.6% per year. The sum of these two measures is reflected 
in the CO
2
-intensity of GDP. In the IEA’s 2DS scenario, 
which assumes an average annual global growth rate of 
just over 3%, the CO
2
-intensity of GDP would need to fall 
by close to 85% from 2012 to 2050, or by a global average 
of 5.3% a year.61 For developing countries, improving 
emissions intensity allows for strong GDP growth while 
total emissions peak and then ultimately decline.
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Table 1 documents recent trends in world CO
2
 emissions 
and three drivers: GDP growth, the energy-intensity of 
GDP and the CO
2
-intensity of energy. Carbon dioxide 
emissions growth did slow significantly, from 3.2% per 
year in 2000–2010, to 1.9% in 2010–2014. Notably, a  
little over half of this decline was due to an accelerating 
decline in the CO
2
-intensity of GDP, to an estimated 
average of -1.3% per year in 2010–2014. Because 
of incomplete data, we are less certain about recent 
trends in the components of the CO
2
-intensity of GDP. 
Nevertheless they are moving in the right direction. 
The pace at which the energy-intensity of GDP is falling 
appears to have picked up modestly, to perhaps -1.4% 
a year in 2010–14. The CO
2
-intensity of energy – the 
“dirtiness of the energy fuel mix” – was actually rising by 
around 0.7% a year in 2000–2010, primarily due to rising 
fossil fuel use in developing countries. However, CO
2
-
intensity growth appears to have slowed significantly 
in 2010–2014, and may even have stabilised. But the 
challenge is clear. Although GHG emissions are gradually 
being decoupled from growth rates, they are not doing  
so at anything like the rate required to put the world  
on a 2°C path. 
This makes the need for both low-carbon and climate-
resilient development strategies even more urgent. 
Growth in developing economies has steadily decelerated 
from 2010 to the present, and remains weak in advanced 
economies. World trade is growing at less than half its 
pre-crisis trend,63 and there are concerns that global 
poverty reduction, which accelerated in the first decade 
of the 21st century, is now slowing down.64 A billion 
people still live on less than US$1.25 a day, now largely 
concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, with 
around 2.4 billion living on less than US$2 a day.65 Yet the 
continued rise in climate risk is most threatening to the 
global poor, who are particularly vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change. Indeed, the warming towards which the 
world is currently headed, of 3°C or 4°C or more, could 
effectively reverse much of the development progress 
made over the last half century.66 Adaptation programmes 
designed to increase resilience to climatic changes must 
therefore be an integral part of development and poverty 
reduction strategies, and need much greater attention 
and financing.67 Yet adaptation alone is not enough, for 
without strong and early mitigation action, temperatures 
will continue to rise. 
Both the need and the opportunity are therefore very 
great. By instigating a step-change in the rate of investment, 
particularly in infrastructure, and by ensuring that this is 
both low-carbon and climate-resilient, the international 
community has the potential to achieve multiple goals at 
once. It can stimulate global growth, restore progress on 
development and poverty reduction, and tackle climate 
risks. This will require serious and sustained attention to 
policy reform. Major obstacles – the protracted effects 
of the global financial crisis, the inheritance of deeply 
embedded market failures, weaknesses in policies 
and institutions, and the momentum of a high-carbon 
economic model built up over the last 150 years – all 
continue to inhibit stronger economic performance.  
But the potential, and the prize, are large.
Table 1
Growth in world CO
2
 emissions from energy and its drivers
1980–2000 2000–2010 2010–2014
Annual average growth (%)
CO
2
 Emissions   1.5   3.2   1.9 
 GDP   3.1   3.8   3.2
 CO
2
-Intensity of GDP -1.5 -0.5 -1.3
 Energy-Intensity of GDP -1.3 -1.2 -1.4
 CO
2
-Intensity of Energy -0.2   0.7   0.1
Sources: World Bank; IEA, 2014; Global Carbon Project, 2014; BP, 2014.62 
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1.2  The potential of international 
cooperation 
These six recent trends and developments are all 
encouraging, but it is clear that none is yet occurring 
at a scale or pace sufficient to create a decisive shift in 
the direction of the global economy. As argued in Better 
Growth, Better Climate, national governments need to focus 
attention on the policies and institutions which can drive 
the necessary reforms: increasing resource efficiency, 
raising infrastructure investment and stimulating 
innovation, particularly in the three economic systems 
of cities, land use and energy. Box 2 summarises lessons 
learnt from different countries about best practices in 
policy-making for low-carbon growth. 
National policy is critical. But the impact of national action 
can be greatly amplified when markets become global. 
The story of solar power provides an illustration. The 
dramatic reduction in the cost of solar PV over the last 
decade arose not just from advances in technology, but 
from governments’ policy choices. The introduction of a 
solar feed-in tariff in Germany in 1991 led to a rapid rise in 
demand over the following two decades, while investment 
in solar manufacturing in China enabled costs to fall and 
supply to be expanded. The result has been the creation 
of a global market, expected to be worth around US$75 
billion in 2016 (up from just US$40 billion just five years 
before),68 with solar power in various uses now affordable 
throughout the world. 
These and other examples – such as the comparable 
reduction in the costs of LED (light emitting diode) lighting 
over the last decade, and the rapid spread of mobile 
phones in Africa, which are making landlines increasingly 
obsolete – show how the creation of global markets 
and new business models can help transform individual 
technologies and national policies into dramatic agents of 
change, reducing costs, driving innovation and catalysing 
widespread dissemination. 
Many of these processes have occurred without a 
deliberate process to drive them. But in many other cases, 
cooperation among governments and multiple other 
stakeholders – businesses, international organisations and 
civil society – has played a crucial role in scaling up and 
accelerating transformative change. 
Both the World Bank and the OECD have recently 
published studies bringing together learning and 
experience of successful policy-making for low-carbon 
growth.69  The World Bank identifies three core principles. 
First, policy-makers need to plan with an eye on the long 
term. There are different ways to achieve short-term 
emissions reductions. But if the end goal is decarbonisation, 
it is vital that decisions now do not lock in high emissions 
in the future. Understanding the multiple economic, social 
and environmental benefits of low-carbon action, as  
Better Growth, Better Climate argues, can help long-term 
decision-making.
Second, carbon pricing is important, but has to be part of 
a wider policy package that triggers far-reaching changes 
in investment patterns, technologies and behaviours. 
The OECD shows how better alignment and integration 
of national policies and regulatory frameworks across 
ministries and sectors offers huge potential to achieve 
stronger impacts and reduce costs.70  In many countries, 
misaligned policies are common, making policy goals 
much harder to achieve. A case in point is the continuing 
subsidisation of fossil fuel production and consumption 
even in countries with climate change mitigation policies. 
But there are many other areas where better alignment 
Box 2
National policy-making for growth and emissions reduction 
is possible, from financial prudential frameworks that 
inadvertently discourage long-term investment, to the 
continued decline in funding for energy RD&D as a share of 
total RD&D spending. Aligning policies in specific sectors 
is also important – for example, in electricity markets and 
urban public transport.
Third, managing the political economy of change is critical. 
As Better Growth, Better Climate argues, governments need 
to ensure that the shift towards a low-carbon economy is 
a “just transition”. Not all climate policies are “win-win”: 
although many jobs will be created, and there will be larger 
markets and profits for many businesses, some jobs will 
also be lost or need to evolve, particularly in high-carbon 
sectors. The human and economic costs of the transition 
should be managed through local economic diversification 
plans and support for displaced workers, affected 
communities and low-income households. Adequate social 
protection will be needed, along with active labour market 
policies to assist retraining and redeployment where 
necessary. Social dialogue and democratic consultation 
of social partners (trade unions and employers) and 
communities is important to ensure acceptance and trust. 
National transition plans are a valuable first step.71  
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First, such cooperation can be a powerful way of  
expanding markets and reducing costs. For example, 
over the last two years, international trade negotiations 
have moved towards reducing tariffs on low-carbon 
goods and services.72 Convergence of national energy 
efficiency standards for appliances and industrial 
equipment can equally expand the available markets 
for national producers and reduce the transaction costs 
of exporting. Collective procurement of low-carbon 
goods and services by a number of city authorities 
and governments – in fields such as electric buses or 
low-carbon construction materials – offers another 
cooperative route to scaling up demand and cutting costs. 
Second, for countries concerned that standards, carbon 
pricing or other climate policies could affect their 
international competitiveness, international cooperation 
can help overcome these anxieties. If multiple countries – 
particularly competitors – act together, this can help keep 
the playing field level. The same is true among businesses 
in globally traded sectors, which may find it difficult to take 
ambitious action alone. In both business and the public 
sector, leadership associations and “clubs” have helped 
support pioneers to take bolder action, both spurring them 
on and protecting them against internal criticism. When 
there is public scrutiny, the power of example can begin 
to change the norms of behaviour even where action is 
voluntary. Yet public policy reinforcement is also needed; 
for example, it is notable that the Tropical Forest Alliance 
2020, which is working to eliminate deforestation from 
commodity supply chains, is not just a business coalition, 
but also involves governments in both forest and  
importing countries. 
A third key benefit of international and multi-stakeholder 
cooperation is that it can enable extensive knowledge-
sharing and capacity-building, and help identify and 
disseminate best practices. Opportunities for action on 
climate change are constantly developing, leading to a 
lot of “learning by doing”. Many international cooperative 
initiatives are already facilitating the exchange of 
information on technologies, standards, policies and 
business models for climate action. They have particular 
value in scaling up solutions, and in transferring knowledge 
across countries and sectors. While historically, this has 
mostly involved North-South cooperation, there has been  
a rapid rise in South-South cooperation in recent years.
Fourth, and crucially, international cooperation is essential 
for expanding finance flows, particularly to the poorest 
countries and to sectors and activities that may not, on 
their own, attract sufficient private investment. This is 
one of the most important forms of intergovernmental 
cooperation, and another area where South-South 
cooperation is growing.73 The multilateral development 
banks, UN agencies and other international organisations 
and partnerships are particularly important institutional 
vehicles for financial flows and capacity-building, with 
their strong capabilities in technical assistance. Achieving 
new agreements for future flows of both public and 
private finance to support sustainable development is 
a vital priority for both the Financing for Development 
and COP21 processes in 2015 (see Box 3). As we discuss 
in Section 2.7, financial cooperation is also important in 
the field of research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D), allowing countries and businesses to share the 
costs of accelerating and disseminating new technologies. 
A new international climate agreement 
The foundation of international cooperation on climate 
change is the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). Despite slow progress in recent 
years, negotiations are now well on the way to achieving 
a comprehensive new climate agreement at the Paris 
Climate Change Conference (COP21) in December. If 
countries can reach an agreement involving universal 
participation, it will be historic, as it will mark the first 
time that all countries make climate action commitments 
under the UNFCCC. 
Such an agreement is important to create an equitable, 
rules-based system for the global governance of climate 
change. But as Better Growth, Better Climate argues, 
a strong agreement will also provide a clear signal to 
businesses and investors that the global economy is 
moving towards a low-carbon pathway. This will help 
shape economic expectations, spurring investment and 
innovation in low-carbon and climate-resilient economic 
activity. It will therefore in itself act to scale up global 
markets and reduce costs, while at the same time making 
the risks attached to high-carbon investment more 
transparent. 
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The major international meetings being held this 
year – the International Conference on Financing for 
Development in July, the United Nations Summit to 
adopt the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in September, the G20 Summit in November, 
and the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in 
December – provide critical opportunities to scale up 
investment to deliver both development and climate 
objectives. 
In all these arenas it is crucial to take an integrated 
approach to building finance frameworks, so they 
can deliver both development and climate objectives 
together. While there are important differences of 
emphasis between the two agendas, the draft SDGs 
under discussion recognise significant synergies, and 
these need to be fully realised. Key areas in which the 
financing framework must be properly integrated include 
delivery of low-carbon infrastructure; promoting energy 
efficiency; building climate resilience and adaptation; 
halting deforestation and reversing land degradation; 
and fostering innovation.
Scaling up finance that supports both development 
and climate objectives will entail expanding domestic 
resource mobilisation, both public and private: this 
is an important need in many developing countries. 
But it also requires much larger international flows, in 
particular to developing countries, from both public and 
private sources. The role of multilateral and regional 
development banks in infrastructure, climate and 
other development financing needs to be significantly 
expanded, along with their support for efforts to 
establish and strengthen domestic policy frameworks. 
This should include increasing their capital base, allowing 
greater flexibility in the management of their balance 
sheets and streamlining decision procedures, alongside 
wider efforts to mainstream both climate change into 
investment strategies and development objectives into 
climate financing. (This is discussed further in Sections 
2.3 and 2.6.) 
While clean energy funds and other development 
financing vehicles have expanded greatly in recent years, 
more can be done. Institutional and policy problems that 
inhibit private investment in infrastructure and low-
carbon projects urgently need to be tackled. Developing 
Box 3
Better finance for growth and climate 
bankable projects that have the right risk-return profile 
to attract private-sector finance remains a challenge. 
Some of the solutions include more stable policies to 
reduce investor uncertainty, as well as development of 
risk-sharing instruments, blended finance approaches 
and reform of financial sector regulations to increase the 
demand for clean infrastructure assets in institutional 
investor portfolios.74  (This is discussed further in Section 
2.3.) This will require strengthening institutions and 
policies for both public revenue and expenditure, as well 
as promoting development of local capital markets and 
financial systems. The outcomes of the Addis Conference 
on Financing for Development, where countries will 
agree how to finance delivery of the SDGs, should launch 
efforts to deliver on this agenda. 
It is within this broader context that countries meeting 
at the UN Climate Conference in Paris need to agree on 
a new climate finance package. In Copenhagen in 2009, 
and confirmed in Cancún in 2010, developed countries 
agreed to mobilise US$100 billion per year by 2020 for 
developing-country climate action, from both public and 
private sources.75  The Green Climate Fund, an important 
vehicle for delivering this finance, was operationalised 
last year after achieving US$10 billion in (multi-year) 
pledges. But a clearly agreed path on how finance will be 
increased to US$100 billion per year from these levels 
is still needed.76  Public finance flows remain critical, 
particularly for adaptation and strengthening resilience. 
These funds, in turn, must leverage far greater sums in 
private investment, both domestic and international. 
Continued efforts are needed to improve definitions of 
climate-relevant investment, to measure, report and 
verify financial flows and identify mobilised finance, and 
to understand and improve the effectiveness of such 
investment on adaptation and mitigation on the ground. 
A new UNFCCC agreement, as well as collaborative 
action agreed in other forums, will be essential to trigger 
wider action to deliver more sustainable infrastructure 
investment in all countries. For example, it could 
reinforce commitments to reduce and rationalise fossil 
fuel subsidies, and strengthen the assessment of climate 
risks and opportunities in fiscal and financial systems.77 
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Better Growth, Better Climate identifies key features of an 
agreement which would enhance this signalling effect  
(see Box 4).
Over the last 18 months, most countries have been 
preparing INDCs that set out their national targets, plans 
and policies beyond 2020 to be included in the Paris 
agreement; several have already been published.78 In most 
countries the preparation process for these documents 
has required a serious – and in some cases unprecedented 
– analysis of how greenhouse gases are related to growth 
trends, and how these can be decoupled, absolutely or 
relatively. In many this represents an important step 
forward for the integration of climate considerations into 
mainstream economic planning. 
Some INDCs represent historically ambitious 
commitments that will require considerable domestic 
effort to implement.79 Nevertheless, initial assessments 
suggest that it is very unlikely that the mitigation actions 
pledged will add up to a global emissions reduction 
consistent with a 2°C pathway. Early estimates suggest 
that global emissions in 2030, if the current and expected 
INDCs are implemented, will be around 55–61.5 Gt 
CO
2
e (up from 49 Gt CO
2
e in 2010).80 This would still be 
well above the median level of emissions (estimated to 
be around 42 Gt CO
2
e) needed to have a more than 50% 
chance of putting the world on a 2°C path. Given the huge 
costs which would be involved in reducing emissions far 
more rapidly after 2030 – likely to involve the writing off of 
many assets – it may in effect risk putting 2°C out of reach.81 
Thus it is essential that the INDCs submitted in 2015 are 
not only as ambitious as possible, but are also seen as the 
starting point, rather than the limit, of countries’ climate 
ambition over the coming years.82 This would follow the 
logic of policy-making: it is evident that policies which 
affect emissions a decade or 15 years into the future will 
not cease being made in 2015. Indeed, given the trends 
discussed in Section 1.1, there are strong reasons to 
believe that low-carbon options will become increasingly 
affordable and accessible. As they do so, policy-makers 
should be encouraged to increase the ambition of their 
climate targets and policies.
It is not the Commission’s role to recommend the specific 
design of a new international legal agreement. But building 
on the conclusions of Better Growth, Better Climate, there 
are some core features which would enhance the ability of 
an agreement to send a clear signal to businesses, investors 
and governments on the future low-carbon and climate-
resilient character of the global economy. These include:83 
• A long-term goal that annual global emissions should 
fall to near zero or below in the second half of the 
century as indicated by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. 
• A predictable and synchronised five-yearly cycle of 
commitments under which countries would gradually 
strengthen their emissions reduction plans over 
time. Countries’ “intended nationally determined 
contributions” (INDCs) published in 2015 should 
be seen as foundations for their climate ambitions 
to 2025 or 2030, not limits to them, able to be 
strengthened (but not weakened) subsequently.
• Encouragement to all major economies to publish long-
term economic development and growth strategies 
outlining how they plan to move in a low-carbon 
and climate-resilient direction. Though different for 
countries at different stages of development, the 
domestic political and policy-making processes needed 
to draw them up would greatly help businesses, 
Box 4
A new international climate agreement 
investors and the wider public understand and debate 
the possibilities, benefits and costs of the low-carbon 
transition. 
• Strengthened incentives and capacities for countries 
to address climate risks and reduce vulnerability 
through national adaptation plans. These would ideally 
incorporate action by sub-national governments and 
city and local government authorities, and set out the 
requirements on businesses and others to understand 
and take action to address climate risks. 
• Common rules for measuring, reporting and verifying 
national policies and their outcomes. Such rules 
will ensure the credibility and transparency of 
commitments, and can also play a valuable role in 
monitoring and managing domestic policy. 
• A framework for increased financial flows into 
low-carbon and climate-resilient investment and 
development. This should include the obligations of 
the richest countries to provide support to developing 
ones, and mechanisms designed to facilitate increased 
flows of private-sector finance.
An international agreement will contain many other 
provisions; this is not intended to be a comprehensive 
description. But an agreement which included these 
elements would provide a major boost to international 
economic confidence. 
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Some have already done this. The EU’s INDC frames 
its 2030 target as a cut of “at least” 40% on 1990 
levels, leaving room for deeper cuts in the context 
of a successful international agreement. Mexico has 
explicitly set two targets, one an “unconditional” GHG 
emission reduction of 25% below business as usual by 
2030, the other a “conditional”’ reduction of 40%, which 
could be achieved subject to progress on a variety of 
issues such as an international carbon price, technical 
cooperation and access to low-cost financial resources 
and technology transfer.84 It would be helpful if this 
approach could be reflected in the general understanding 
that INDCs published in 2015 are “floors, not ceilings” 
– lower bounds to ambition which can be strengthened 
when circumstances change, either before or after the 
Paris conference. 
Cooperation on climate outside of the 
UNFCCC 
International cooperation on climate-related issues 
has also blossomed outside the UNFCCC – one of the 
most significant developments in recent years. This 
includes increased attention to climate action in other 
multilateral processes, such as the development of the 
SDGs (which include a proposed goal on climate change 
as well as others related to it), discussions on Financing 
for Development, and under the G7 and G20. But it also 
goes well beyond these intergovernmental processes. 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives have been launched on 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, transport, cities, 
agriculture, forests, short-lived climate pollutants, 
finance and adaptation, among others.85 Many of these 
were showcased at the UN Climate Summit in New York 
in September 2014, an unprecedented gathering of 
government, business and civil society leaders.86 
At the Lima Climate Change Conference in December 
2014, the Governments of Peru and France, in association 
with the UN Secretary General and UNFCCC Secretariat, 
launched the “Lima-Paris Action Agenda”, aiming to 
provide a platform for multi-stakeholder climate solutions 
at the Paris conference.87 The UNFCCC Secretariat has 
established a portal where actions by non-state actors 
and international cooperative initiatives are registered 
and recognised, backed by an independently compiled 
database.88 Serious efforts are now being made to produce 
methodologies by which these actions can be properly 
measured and assessed.89 
Many of these initiatives are relatively new and still 
in development, however, and participation remains 
relatively narrow. A major expansion of cooperation is 
both possible and vital, if the full range of opportunities for 
growth-enhancing climate action are to be realised. This 
report in particular highlights 10 areas of international and 
multi-stakeholder cooperation with significant potential. 
In some, there are already initiatives with considerable 
momentum, but which need wider participation to have 
significant impact. Others represent opportunities that 
have yet to be seized. The initiatives fall into four broad 
categories: 
• Common commitments or intentions by 
governments for national action, in some cases 
supported by programmes of technical assistance, 
regular monitoring of progress, and peer review. 
In the case of infrastructure investment and 
energy efficiency standards, we propose enhanced 
cooperation among the countries of the G20, in 
association with others; in the fields of carbon pricing, 
fossil fuel subsidy reform, and support for low-carbon 
innovation, we argue for informal associations of 
“coalitions of the willing” and bilateral and plurilateral 
partnerships between interested countries. 
• Common commitments by non-state actors,  
supported by standardised methodologies, the 
development of rules and norms, and mutual 
exchange of best practice. This model applies to  
our recommendations for actions by major cities  
and leading businesses. 
• Multi-stakeholder financing partnerships. In a 
number of fields, governments can work with the 
private sector, international organisations and civil 
society to unlock flows of finance. This applies to our 
proposals to support degraded land restoration and 
forest conservation and to scale up investment in clean 
energy and energy access and for urban development. 
• Multilateral market regulation under a multilateral 
treaty. This applies to our recommendations on 
reducing emissions in the aviation and maritime sectors 
and on phasing down hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). 
The areas identified in this report do not exhaust the 
full range of available opportunities for partnership or 
cooperation. But in each of them cooperative action could 
generate significant economic benefits and emission 
reductions – and there is potential for key commitments 
to be made this year or next. The first criterion is critical: 
in each case, there are powerful reasons for governments, 
cities, businesses and others to work together to 
implement the proposals, even without consideration of 
their climate impact. They will have economic benefits 
– both in terms of growth, employment and poverty 
reduction, and more broadly through improved air quality 
and public health, reduced congestion, improved quality 
of life, and more. In short, they can help generate “better 
growth” as defined in Better Growth, Better Climate. 
The analysis here has also estimated their climate 
benefits, where possible. The methodology and numbers 
are explained in a separate Technical Note.90 It is of course 
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not the international cooperation itself which has the 
mitigation potential; it is the policies and investments 
themselves. But cooperative partnerships can help catalyse 
and support that action. Some of the actions overlap with 
one another in terms of their impacts on emissions; these 
have been subtracted to arrive at the total potential. 
Overall, if the recommended actions were implemented, 
the analysis suggests that global GHG emissions in 2030 
would be 16–26 Gt CO
2
e lower than under a “business as 
usual” scenario, i.e. if current trends were to continue with 
no new policies introduced. This represents between 59% 
and 96% of the reductions likely to be needed by 2030 to 
put the world on a pathway consistent with holding global 
warming to 2°C (see Figure 4).91
This shows that the emissions reductions envisaged in 
INDCs are only a fraction of the economically beneficial 
options for climate mitigation possible over the next 15 
years. This is not surprising, as INDCs generally reflect 
what countries believe they can achieve on their own, 
“nationally determined”. Enhanced action by a variety of 
other stakeholders and through international cooperation 
can enable them to do more. 
This does not mean that the emissions reduction potential 
from these cooperative initiatives would all be “additional” 
to the commitments in the INDCs (except in international 
aviation and shipping, where emissions are not included 
in national inventories). Rather, insofar as countries are 
not yet planning to pursue the actions recommended 
here, the analysis indicates the potential to raise national 
commitments in the future. Multi-stakeholder action and 
international cooperation can thus help governments 
achieve considerably more mitigation than they now see  
as feasible. 
In this sense the Paris climate conference, building on the 
Financing for Development and Sustainable Development 
Goal conferences earlier in the year, creates a much 
broader opportunity to promote action for growth and 
climate. Nationally determined commitments will be 
the bedrock of the new international agreement. But as 
this report shows, national action can be supplemented, 
in Paris and beyond, by many forms of international 
and multi-stakeholder cooperation. In all the fields 
outlined in this report, governments, states and regions, 
cities, businesses, and international and civil society 
organisations have the opportunity to bring forward new 
commitments to driving low-carbon and climate-resilient 
growth. These have the potential to enable countries to 
reduce emissions much further than they can on their 
own. They can bring the world as a whole much closer 
to the 2°C pathway. And they can bring all countries the 
benefits of stronger economic performance, development 
and poverty reduction. 
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PART II: KEY AREAS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ACTION
2.1  Accelerate low-carbon 
development in the world’s cities 
We live in an urban era. Cities are growing at an 
unprecedented rate, particularly in the developing world, 
with 1.4 million people added to urban areas each week. 
By 2030, around 60% of the global population will live in 
cities.93 Cities are engines of economic growth and social 
change, expected to produce about 85% of global GDP 
in 201594 – and they generate 71–76% of energy-related 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.95 With their dense 
populations, concentrations of property and infrastructure, 
and large paved areas, cities are also particularly vulnerable 
to floods, storm surges and other climate impacts, 
particularly in coastal regions and along rivers.
All these factors make it crucial to ensure that the 
infrastructure investments made in cities in the next several 
years are both low-carbon and climate-resilient. As shown 
in Better Growth, Better Climate, cities have much to gain 
from adopting more compact, connected and efficient forms 
of development: greater economic productivity and appeal 
to investors, improved air quality and public health, reduced 
poverty and enhanced safety, and substantial avoided 
infrastructure and public service costs. For urban leaders, 
low-carbon strategies are thus as much about building 
healthier, more liveable and more productive cities as  
about reducing GHG emissions. 
Mayors and local authorities increasingly recognise the 
economic and other benefits of climate action, and many are 
not only demonstrating leadership by taking action in their 
own cities, but engaging their peers and working to raise 
ambition through groups such as the C40 Cities Climate 
Leadership Group, Local Governments for Sustainability 
(ICLEI) and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). 
Members of these networks have already agreed to 
commitments equivalent to 0.4 Gt CO
2
 in annual emission 
reductions by 2030.96 And momentum is growing. 
At the UN Climate Summit in 2014, urban leaders formed 
a new “Compact of Mayors” committed to tracking and 
reducing GHG emissions under a common accountability 
framework, while also making their cities more resilient.97 
As of June 2015, 80 cities have signed on, and many more 
are expected to join. The Compact builds on existing 
initiatives, such as the Covenant of Mayors in Europe, 
whose more than 6,000 signatories have set emission 
reduction targets and adopted sustainable energy action 
plans to help meet them. 
But action needs to be scaled up and accelerated. Many 
cities, particularly in developing countries, need support 
from national and international institutions to transition to 
low-carbon development models. National policy is critical, 
generally determining the powers and financial resources 
available to city authorities. Regional and provincial 
governments can also play crucial roles – particularly as 
many are leading low-carbon action themselves, including 
through their own international Compact of States and 
Regions formed in 2014.98 At all levels, policy and finance 
environments need to shift quickly and significantly to help 
cities, states and regions change course.
A major economic opportunity
New analysis undertaken for this report shows that low-
carbon urban actions represent a US$16.6 trillion global 
economic opportunity.99 This analysis builds on a 2014 
study for the UN Special Envoy for Cities and Climate 
Change and C40, which found that 11 key low-carbon 
measures in the buildings, transport and waste sectors, 
where cities have the greatest power to take action, could 
generate annual savings of 3.7 Gt CO
2
e in 2030 and 8.0 
Gt CO
2
e in 2050.100 The largest 500 cities by population 
could contribute annual savings of 1.65 Gt CO
2
e by 2030, 
nearly half the identified urban mitigation potential.101 
To evaluate the economic case for large-scale deployment 
of these measures, the New Climate Economy assessed 
the incremental costs that cities would face if they 
implemented them instead of their higher-carbon 
equivalents. The costs were then compared with the 
savings these measures would generate up to 2050 
through reduced energy demand, relative to business 
as usual.102 The analysis was deliberately conservative, 
excluding savings that would accrue beyond 2050 and 
presenting only direct cost savings, not wider social, 
economic and environmental benefits. 
Even so, the analysis makes a compelling economic case 
for significant low-carbon investment in cities. In the 
central scenario, these measures would cost US$977 
billion per year on average globally in 2015–2050, but 
they would reduce annual energy costs by US$1.58 trillion 
in 2030 and US$5.85 trillion in 2050. Thus, collectively, 
the investments would pay for themselves within 16 years. 
In this scenario, the net present value (NPV) of the savings 
generated for cities in 2015–2050 would be US$16.6 
trillion. It is important to note, however, that not all low-
carbon investments will have a positive NPV, and some 
may also involve significant opportunity costs. 
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The returns would be even greater with wider policy 
action. With higher energy prices through fossil fuel 
subsidy reform and carbon pricing, together with enabling 
policy interventions, such as support for low-carbon 
innovation, the NPV of the stream of savings that the 
investments would generate could rise to US$21.86 
trillion through 2050 (under a discount rate of 5%), 
which offers substantial scope to secure private-sector 
investment. In a scenario with lower energy prices and 
slower technological learning, this bundle of measures 
would still have a positive NPV of US$4.85 trillion with  
a real discount rate of 3%.
Success stories around the world – and scope 
for much more
Yet the benefits of low-carbon investment go far 
beyond direct cost savings. Making cities more compact, 
connected and efficient can generate sustained urban 
productivity improvements and a wide range of economic, 
social and environmental benefits. The goal is to manage 
urban expansion to encourage dense, transit-oriented and 
liveable urban forms, and to unlock agglomeration effects 
and networking advantages. Such an approach could help 
to avoid the extensive traffic congestion that is causing 
serious social and economic costs in cities throughout 
the world, and to reduce the traffic accidents that kill 
around 1.25 million people annually, over 90% of them in 
developing countries.103 It could also significantly reduce 
the cost of providing services and infrastructure for public 
transport, energy, water and waste. Analysis for Better 
Growth, Better Climate showed that compact, connected 
urban growth could reduce global infrastructure 
investment requirements by more than US$3 trillion in 
2015–2030.104
Case studies of low-carbon urban actions around the 
world – in both developed and developing countries – 
show they can yield multiple benefits beyond direct energy 
and GHG savings. There are a growing number of success 
stories involving “green buildings” and energy efficiency 
standards for new construction, as well as for retrofits 
of existing buildings. Many cities are also expanding and 
improving mass transit, embracing bus rapid transit (BRT) 
in particular, which costs, on average, one-tenth as much 
as metro rail transit.105 Infrastructure that makes cycling 
easier and safer improves public health by promoting 
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Source: Gouldson et al., 2015.107  
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physical activity and reducing air pollution and vehicle 
accidents.108 Moreover, cycling is a low-cost option that 
can enhance mobility for the urban poor.109 Cities are also 
discovering the benefits of building distributed energy 
systems based on small-scale renewables, particularly as 
costs have dropped sharply in recent years.
International cooperation can encourage cities to raise 
their ambitions, and enables them to track their progress 
towards low-carbon goals. Not enough cities have 
prepared credible emission inventories or made firm 
emission reduction commitments, and few have long-
term targets, which are crucial to sustaining emission 
reductions over time. Through international cooperation, 
standardised methodologies are being developed 
and implemented that may also help cities to access 
technical and financial assistance from international 
financial institutions. In turn, new international initiatives 
promoting common platforms for action such as the 
Compact of Mayors can help to promote a “race to the 
top”, with cities competing for capital by using low-carbon 
strategies to boost their appeal to investors. 
International cooperation can also play a critical role 
in equipping cities with the knowledge and skills to 
understand the science, economics, policy options and 
business models they need to identify and implement 
suitable low-carbon measures. Only about 20% of 
the world’s 150 largest cities have even the most 
basic analytics needed for low-carbon planning.110 
International organisations such as UN Habitat and 
the international city networks can help to address 
skills gaps at the local level by training municipal staff 
and political leaders, particularly in emerging and 
developing economies. The Habitat III Conference in 
October 2016 will be an opportunity to discuss and 
learn lessons from cities, towns and villages around 
the world on how to achieve sustainable urban 
development and to identify emerging challenges.
Moreover, international institutions can help cities 
build institutional capacity, for example by helping to 
establish integrated municipal authorities to address 
cross-cutting challenges such as effective land use and 
transport planning.111 They can support national and 
provincial as well as local decision-makers by providing 
climate-relevant data at the city scale. And they can 
help cities overcome the huge financial constraints 
many face in identifying, developing and implementing 
“investment-ready” programmes or projects that can 
attract private investment, and helping them to improve 
their creditworthiness. According to the World Bank, only 
4% of the 500 largest cities in developing countries are 
deemed creditworthy in international financial markets, 
and investing US$1 to boost a city’s creditworthiness can 
leverage more than US$100 in private finance.112 Finally, 
international institutions can help national governments 
to recognise the critical role that cities play in a country’s 
development, empower them to take action and attract 
investment, and support them through national policies. 
The economic case for low-carbon urban development is 
compelling, and international cooperation, led by nations 
and cities and supported by international organisations, 
can amplify and accelerate action. 
The Commission recommends that all cities commit to 
developing and implementing low-carbon development 
strategies by 2020, using where possible the framework of 
the Compact of Mayors, prioritising policies and investments 
in public, non-motorised and low-emissions transport, 
building efficiency, renewable energy and efficient waste 
management. 
Development agencies and other finance institutions, city 
networks and organisations, and multilateral and regional 
development banks, should help to accelerate and scale 
up these efforts by developing an integrated package of 
US$1 billion or more 113 over five years, to support at least 
the world’s largest 500 cities by 2020 in (i) complying 
with the Compact of Mayors; (ii) strengthening capacities 
for project preparation; (iii) enhancing creditworthiness; 
(iv) accessing climate finance more directly to cover the 
incremental up front costs of low-carbon options when 
agreed in partnership with nation states; and (v) improving 
access to platforms for knowledge-sharing and technology 
transfer through global city networks.114 The package could 
directly mobilise at least US$5-10 billion115 in private 
investment through project preparation support and 
leverage significant further large-scale capital to support 
a low-carbon urban transition. The package should build 
on existing leadership and efforts by cities using their 
own resources and prioritise filling critical resource gaps 
in smaller cities and cities in developing countries. 
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn
is Gouldson, A., Colenbrander, S., Godfrey, N., Sudmant, 
A., Millward-Hopkins, J., Fang, W. and Zhao, X., 2015. 
Accelerating Low-Carbon Development in the World’s Cities. 
A New Climate Economy contributing paper for Seizing 
the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and 
a Better Climate. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.
report/misc/working-papers.
2.2  Restore and protect agricultural 
and forest landscapes and increase 
agricultural productivity   
Global demand for agricultural and forestry commodities 
– food, fuel, fibre and timber – is rising rapidly, primarily 
in emerging and developing economies. This creates 
vital opportunities for economic growth, but it also puts 
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pressure on natural resources. With the global population 
expected to grow by 1.2 billion by 2030 – and the global 
middle class to roughly double by 2030 – that pressure 
will only increase.116 About 70% more food calories will 
need to be produced by 2050, while demand for wood 
products will increase three- to fourfold.117 
Countries face the simultaneous challenges of raising 
agricultural and forest productivity, preventing 
deforestation, improving the governance of natural 
resource use and strengthening the resilience of land use 
systems to climate change and other threats. As argued in 
Better Growth, Better Climate, the linkages between these 
challenges require a holistic approach. Unless they are 
addressed together, fixing problems in one area will just 
shift them to others.  
Agriculture and land use change, including change 
through deforestation, account for roughly a quarter 
of global GHG emissions. Both agriculture and forests 
are also already feeling the impact of climate change. 
Reducing emissions and increasing resilience while 
boosting productivity will require strong national policies 
and scaled-up international and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships to support them.  
Better Growth, Better Climate examines multiple 
opportunities for public policy and land use practices 
to boost productivity and resilience while reducing 
emissions. This includes both supply-side measures, such 
as the use of new crop varieties and new techniques of 
livestock management, and demand-side measures, such 
as reducing food loss and waste. This report focuses on 
two critical areas that require much greater international 
cooperation, involving both public and private actors: 
investments to restore degraded agricultural and forest 
landscapes, and international finance to halt and reverse 
deforestation, supported by commodity supply-chain 
commitments. 
An urgent challenge 
A quarter of the world’s agricultural land is severely 
degraded,118 primarily in developing countries, and 
another 12 million hectares are lost each year due to 
poor soil and water management and other unsustainable 
farming practices.119 The UN estimates that degradation 
of agricultural landscapes cost US$40 billion worldwide in 
2014, not counting the hidden costs of increased fertiliser 
use and loss of biodiversity and unique landscapes.120 
At the same time, 13 million ha of forest are being cleared 
each year.121 About 30% of global forest cover has been 
cleared,122 and over a quarter is degraded; only 21% 
remains intact.123 The expansion of agriculture has played 
a key role in this. Global agricultural land area, including 
permanent pastures, grew by about 10% or 477 million 
ha in the 50 years up to 2013.124 In the past decade, 
most of the forest loss has occurred in the tropics, with 
commercial agriculture responsible for 71% of tropical 
deforestation worldwide in 2000–2012, much of it 
illegal.125 Wood and pulp production and, in some places, 
mining have also contributed to natural forest loss and 
degradation. 
The environmental and economic impact of these trends 
is enormous. In 1990–2010, carbon storage equivalent 
to about 15% of manmade global GHG emissions was 
lost each year.126 Vital ecosystem services have been 
compromised. The ecosystem services provided by 
forests, including pollination and regulation of water 
flows that support nearby agricultural productivity, have 
been estimated at US$3,100–6,120 per ha per year. This 
implies an additional cost of annual gross deforestation  
of US$40–80 billion.127
These trends can be reversed. Brazil has slowed 
deforestation by 70% since 2005, through a combination 
of economic incentives and law enforcement. Indonesia 
has extended its moratorium on new concessions 
for the conversion of primary forests. From China to 
Niger, landscape restoration projects using a variety 
of approaches, including “climate-smart agriculture” 
techniques such as no-till farming and agroforestry, are 
stopping erosion, re-greening land and restoring tree 
cover. These efforts are raising the incomes of agrarian 
and forest communities, boosting the productivity 
and resilience of land, and cutting net emissions. They 
are mutually supportive, making it critical that public 
policy reforms by national governments support the 
management of landscapes as a whole.  
New partnerships 
If these successes are to be scaled up, however, national 
policy in many countries will need to be supported 
by strong international cooperation. There is great 
momentum already. More than 175 governments (from 
tropical forest-rich countries and elsewhere), companies, 
civil society institutions and indigenous peoples’ groups 
have endorsed the New York Declaration on Forests 
launched at the UN Climate Summit in September 2014. 
They pledge to work together to cut natural forest loss in 
half by the end of the decade, end it entirely by 2030, and 
restore more than 350 million ha of forests by 2030.128 
The Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture 
(GACSA) was also launched at the Summit, the result 
of three years’ collaboration to increase investment in 
agricultural productivity and resilience and help reduce 
agriculture’s large carbon footprint.129 The revamped 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) and the new Global Research Alliance 
on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases are helping to advance 
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and accelerate crucial research.130 And other initiatives 
are emerging, such as the business-led Low Carbon 
Technology Partnership initiatives on forests and on 
climate-smart agriculture under the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
Prominent regional initiatives are also making an impact. 
The Africa Climate-Smart Agriculture Alliance (ACSAA) 
aims to see 6 million smallholder farms in Africa practising 
CSA within seven years.131 Initiative 20x20 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, launched at the Lima Climate 
Change Conference in December 2014, set out to initiate 
restoration of 20 million ha of degraded agricultural 
and forest land by 2020. So far nine Latin American and 
Caribbean countries and two regional programmes have 
committed to restoring more than 21 million ha, and more 
commitments are expected. 
Leading businesses are also now working to ensure more 
socially and environmentally sustainable practices.132 
Members of the Consumer Goods Forum (CGF), an 
industry association representing companies with more 
than US$3 trillion in annual revenue, pledged in 2010 
to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains 
by 2020.133 In 2012, members of the CGF, including 
Unilever and Nestlé, partnered with a number of tropical 
forest countries and other governments, as well as 
environmental and other civil society organisations, to 
form the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 (TFA 2020), a 
multi-stakeholder platform to eliminate deforestation 
from global commodity markets.134 Several major 
commodities traders – including Wilmar and Cargill – have 
now joined them. Overall, company commitments now 
cover more than 90% of the global palm oil supply chain.135 
These efforts are being supported by new technologies 
and tools that enable radical transparency in monitoring 
progress, for example Global Forest Watch, which 
provides near real-time data on tree cover change. 
By working together, governments, consumer goods 
companies, local producers, civil society organisations 
and communities have the potential to achieve change 
which would have been beyond any of them working 
on their own. The key now is to translate pledges into 
effective actions – from economic incentives, to effective 
monitoring of suppliers and improved transparency in 
supply chains. It is also critical to establish comparable 
commitments and partnerships in other commodities 
affecting forests, notably soy, beef, and pulp and paper.  
Financing land restoration 
One of the greatest challenges is how to pay for large-
scale restoration of agricultural land and forests. Human-
caused degradation of whole landscapes today is mainly 
a challenge in developing countries.136 Governments 
in these countries often lack the resources to stop 
degradation, much less to restore land. And while 
commercial-scale operations are often the culprits, 
smallholders are also involved, and they have limited 
capital. Moreover, although farmers can benefit from 
restoration and investments in more sustainable 
management, through increased crop yields or new 
forest products to sell, some of the biggest benefits, such 
as better water retention, cleaner and more plentiful 
water supply, cleaner air, higher biodiversity and better 
pollination, are public goods that cannot be monetised 
easily by farmers and landowners. 
Current global investment from all sources, public and 
private, in restoration and conservation of mixed landscapes 
is estimated at US$50 billion per year, of which about half is 
in emerging and developing countries.137 On the other hand, 
global needs for investment in conservation and restoration 
have been independently estimated at US$200–300 billion 
per year.138 This leaves an estimated shortfall of about 
US$150–250 billion per year. There is a pressing need to 
scale up both public and private investment, domestic and 
international, to fill this gap. 
Official development assistance and existing private 
direct foreign investment in agriculture and forest-related 
activities in developing countries is currently less than 
US$7 billion per year.139 Thus, most of the needed new 
investment will have to come from domestic sources 
and greatly expanded investment from the international 
private sector. The latter is likely to involve “impact 
investing” – private (typically internationally active) 
investors seeking to achieve social and/or environmental 
impacts along with financial returns.140 Impact investing 
for landscape conservation and restoration is expected to 
reach at least US$6 billion total in 2014–2018, triple the 
level of the previous five years.141 But much more finance 
is needed, and key barriers need to be overcome to ensure 
a good supply of deals with adequate collateral, sufficient 
prospects for future cash flow and acceptable risk-reward 
profiles. Strong domestic policy frameworks aimed at 
addressing the key market and governance failures 
which help drive unsustainable land use practises – from 
agricultural input subsidies to inadequately defined and 
defended property rights – are crucial.  
Several further elements will be needed to overcome 
financing barriers to scale up private investment: capacity-
building, concessional bridge funding for project start-ups 
and catalytic first-loss equity investment, which can all be 
funded by targeted multilateral public and philanthropic 
cooperation. More public and private impact investment, 
and partnerships between them, are required to have 
results at scale. 
To reduce financial risks, “capital stacking” could play an 
important role. This is a common risk-sharing approach 
in which institutional or philanthropic investors typically 
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provide first-loss equity, impact investors provide 
preferred equity, and other private investors provide 
protected debt equity. Publicly-funded institutional 
investors may be able to leverage private capital on 
as much as a 10:1 basis by accepting a 10% first-loss 
for being the junior equity partner in a stacked capital 
deal.142 The evidence suggests that pooling risks across 
institutional investors and developing expertise within 
one facility can lead to cost savings. Public investments 
will also be needed for capacity building and to underwrite 
start-up costs, especially in the case of smallholders.  
This approach is likely to be most fruitful when it is part  
of a broader unified approach, such as land restoration  
across a given region.
Making the most of REDD+
Another key area for enhanced cooperation is REDD+: 
reducing emissions from deforestation, forest 
degradation, conservation, sustainable management 
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. 
REDD+ is a system whereby forest countries make 
domestic commitments to maintain more forests and are 
then supported by developed countries. International 
assistance can help forest countries develop strategies 
and build capacity to implement national policies and 
develop projects to reduce emissions. Those able to 
deliver deforestation reductions – and reliably measure, 
report and verify them – can enter into carbon finance 
agreements with advanced economies and multilateral 
development banks, with a “results-based payment” for 
emission reductions below the agreed reference level.143 
Results-based REDD+ works most efficiently and 
equitably when strong governance is in place, including 
clear land rights, effective land use planning and strong 
law enforcement. Where there is political commitment to 
reduce deforestation, early direct investments can help 
to build these critical capacities and systems. Results-
based payments are not the only option, and some forest 
countries and donors may choose other approaches. 
However, results-based REDD+ schemes are inherently 
efficient. If they fail to deliver large-scale results, the 
amounts paid will be much smaller. Many forest countries 
and subnational jurisdictions have started down this path. 
Sixty-five developing countries have joined either (or both) 
the UN-REDD+ Programme or the World Bank’s Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), 54 of which have had 
plans approved for funding.144 Funders are also stepping 
up, making funds for REDD+ readiness and results-based-
payments increasingly available. The Green Climate 
Fund will be able to provide payments for REDD+ results 
through the UNFCCC process (as reflected in the Warsaw 
Framework for REDD+). Between 2008 and the end of 
2014, US$2.8 billion had been pledged to five multilateral 
funds that support REDD+, with an increase of two-thirds 
in the value of overall project approvals since November 
2013.145 REDD+ agreements can also spur enhanced 
national action: a pledge of US$1 billion from Norway to 
Indonesia, for example, has supported the moratorium on 
clearing forests and a mapping initiative to clarify property 
rights that has exposed significant overlapping and illegal 
forest holdings. This unprecedented transparency is 
helping to pave the way for private sector commitments.146
All these efforts are closely interlinked, and need to be 
addressed cooperatively to achieve synergies and avoid 
conflicts. For example, boosting agricultural productivity 
could lead to increased deforestation on adjoining lands 
if protection of forests is not simultaneously enforced. 
Similarly, forest protection in one area can simply shift 
deforestation to another. Yet at the same time, climate-
smart approaches such as agroforestry can add tree cover 
while also boosting food production. Deforestation-free 
supply chain efforts combined with REDD+ can also 
dramatically change economic incentives for farmers. 
Most importantly, a coordinated, integrated national 
approach to landscape management is needed which aims 
simultaneously to address resource conservation and 
restoration, boost the productivity of land, and promote 
rural economic development and poverty reduction.  
The Commission recommends that governments, multilateral 
and bilateral finance institutions, the private sector and 
willing investors work together to scale up sustainable 
land use financing, towards a global target of halting 
deforestation and putting into restoration at least 500 
million ha of degraded farmlands and forests by 2030. 
Developed economies and forested developing countries 
should enter into partnerships that scale up international 
flows for REDD+, focused increasingly on mechanisms 
that generate verified emission reductions, with the aim 
of financing an additional reduction of 1 Gt CO2e per year 
from 2020 and beyond. The private sector should commit to 
extending deforestation-free supply chain commitments for 
key commodities and enhanced financing to support this.
Collectively, the analysis conducted for the Commission 
estimates that these efforts can lead to emission 
reductions of 3.3–9.0 Gt CO
2
e in 2030 while making 
agriculture more productive and resilient, and boosting 
the incomes of agrarian and forest communities in 
developing countries.
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn
is Delgado, C., Wolosin, M. and Purvis, N., 2015. Restoring 
and Protecting Agricultural and Forest Landscapes and 
Increasing Agricultural Productivity. A New Climate 
Economy contributing paper for Seizing the Global 
Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better 
Climate. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/
misc/working-papers.
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compete with fossil fuels with low or no subsidies in more 
and more places.157 Thus, while about the same amount 
was invested in renewables in 2014 as in 2011 (about 
US$270-280 billion), it bought 35% more capacity.158 
At the same time, advances in smart grid, information 
technology systems, and energy storage technologies are 
beginning to make possible new ways of managing demand 
instead of increasing supply.159 The modular nature of 
solar PV also enables it to bring electricity to populations 
far from the grid – a major need in many developing 
countries. Decreasing battery costs could allow solar 
and other renewables to make an even greater impact, 
enabling electricity storage off-grid in rural areas and 
more efficient management of grid electricity, balancing 
demand and providing backup during blackouts.160  
Achieving a major shift towards clean energy investment 
will require new policy and finance approaches. Despite 
recent progress, there are still technical challenges in 
integrating large-scale renewables into electricity grids. 
And there is competition from natural gas, a cheaper and 
often easier alternative to coal for power generation – 
though it also brings problems of its own.161 Fossil fuel 
subsidies and the lack of a carbon price in much of the 
world boost fossil fuels’ price advantage. And most energy 
markets, regulatory frameworks and business models are 
still designed for fossil fuel generation, and remain  ill-
2.3  Invest at least US$1 trillion a 
year in clean energy 
Clean energy investment has grown rapidly in recent 
years: US$270 billion was invested in renewables in 
2014, and at least US$130 billion in energy efficiency. In 
2013, for the first time, the world added more low-carbon 
electricity capacity than fossil fuel capacity.147 The costs of 
low-carbon technologies continue to fall, and new finance 
vehicles are starting to take off: issuances of “green 
bonds”, for example (which go beyond just clean energy) 
tripled within a year, to US$36.6 billion in 2014.148 
The case for large-scale clean energy investment is 
strong. In the next 15 years, energy demand is projected 
to grow by 25–35%, as up to 3 billion people enter the 
global middle class and world economic output doubles.149 
About 1.3 billion people still lack access to electricity, and 
many more have only partial or unreliable service.150 But 
the kind of energy supply the world invests in matters a 
great deal. Globally, an estimated 3.7 million people die 
prematurely each year due to ambient air pollution, much 
of it related to fossil fuel combustion.151 CO
2
 emissions 
from fossil fuel use make up about two-thirds of global 
GHG emissions. For countries dependent on fossil fuels, 
continued oil price volatility poses significant energy 
security risks.152
Yet about 40% of the world’s electricity still comes from 
coal, one of the most polluting fuels.153 And, despite 
rising investment in clean energy, of the US$1.6 trillion 
invested in the global energy supply in 2013, nearly 70% 
was related to fossil fuels.154 Avoiding the many negative 
impacts of fossil fuel use, and meeting the goal of holding 
global warming to under 2°C, will require a major shift  
in investment.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that to 
achieve a 2°C pathway, annual investment in low-carbon 
power supply – solar, wind, hydropower, bioenergy and 
nuclear, as well as carbon capture and storage – will need 
to grow to an average of about US$520 billion per year 
between 2014 and 2035.155 Energy efficiency investment 
in buildings and industry also needs to grow, to average 
about US$250 billion per year. In total, public- and private-
sector investment in clean energy needs to reach at least 
US$1 trillion per year by 2030, while investment in fossil 
fuels, particularly coal, declines sharply.156
Such a shift is possible now, in a way that was once 
unthinkable, because of a dramatic reduction in the costs 
of clean energy technologies. Solar PV modules are about 
80% cheaper than in 2008, and the cost of utility-scale 
solar PV has halved in four years. Solar and wind can now 
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adapted to the special characteristics of renewables  
and energy demand reduction.
Connecting projects with capital
There is no shortage of global capital for investment. 
But making clean energy projects, particularly those in 
developing countries, attractive to major private-sector 
investors will require a concerted international effort. 
Cooperation between the public and private sectors 
is needed to improve the risk-reward profile of low-
carbon energy projects and thus lower the cost of capital 
and increase its supply. Policy actions can improve the 
investment environment for clean energy – for example, 
by ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of international 
investment; designing open and transparent procurement 
processes; improving the governance and regulatory 
quality of electricity markets; and coordinating the 
development of the electricity grid with deployment of 
clean energy generation.163 Institutional capacity-building 
is also often needed.
Projects using well-established low-carbon technologies, 
such as onshore wind and solar, should be low-risk 
investments, as they have no fuel costs and are relatively 
simple to operate. But today, these projects are often 
covered by financing and market arrangements that 
introduce risk, ranging from currency risk to fossil fuel 
price volatility, which raises the cost of capital.164 For 
example, renewable energy is often owned by the same 
investors and financed through the same structures as 
those for conventional energy projects, meaning that the 
cost of capital faced by renewables is linked to that for 
utilities, independent power producers and fossil fuel 
plants. Volatile foreign exchange rates and uncertainties 
around policies such as feed-in tariffs for renewable 
energy introduce further risk.
Measures to mitigate and reallocate risks could therefore 
substantially improve both the availability and the cost 
of capital for clean energy projects, which in turn would 
lower the cost of low-carbon electricity. Capital costs 
can make up 90% of the total lifetime cost of a renewable 
energy project; if clean energy projects could access low-
cost, long-term finance reflecting their intrinsic production 
profile, the cost of low-carbon electricity could be up to 
20% lower in developed economies and 30% in emerging 
economies.165 Over recent years, a number of financial 
instruments have been developed to mitigate and reallocate 
risk in these ways, including credit guarantees and currency 
swaps, green bonds, and investment funds such as 
“YieldCos”.166 These are attracting increasing private-sector 
interest, as investors look for long-term returns and as 
growing coalitions of investors seek to incorporate climate 
concerns into their investment strategies.167
There are now major opportunities for international 
cooperation to scale up efforts to improve the risk-return 
profile of clean energy projects. By working together 
at national and international levels, governments, 
development finance institutions and other investors such 
as sovereign wealth funds, together with private-sector 
investors, have the capacity to mobilise the US$1 trillion  
in annual investment that is needed.
A key role for development banks
Multilateral and national development banks have 
a crucial role to play.168 These development finance 
institutions (DFIs) committed US$126 billion of their 
own capital to climate-related investments in 2013, 
including adaptation.169 The multilateral development 
banks (MDBs), made up of the World Bank Group and 
regional development banks, provided US$24 billion 
of this in 2013, and US$75 billion in total in the three 
years from 2011.170 Among the national development 
banks, as of 2012, the China Development Bank 
had invested close to a cumulative US$80 billion in 
clean energy infrastructure, Germany’s KfW close to 
US$150 billion, and the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) around US$50 million.171 New DFIs based in 
emerging economies, including the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the New Development Bank 
(known as the “BRICS Bank”), are also poised to 
become major sources of infrastructure financing.172 
Given the importance of infrastructure to growth in 
developing countries, and the present large shortfall in 
infrastructure investment,173 there is a strong case for 
an expansion of the role of MDB finance in this field. This 
could include an increase in their capital funding and 
balance sheets, a reallocation of investment priorities, 
an increase in risk appetite, for example in loan to equity 
ratios, and stronger use of new financial instruments.174 
Such reforms would enhance MDB capacity to mitigate 
risk and leverage greater private finance. MDBs have 
a particularly crucial role to play in preparing bankable 
projects which can attract private investment, a crucial 
need in many developing countries. 
DFIs are also well positioned to lead efforts to strengthen 
international cooperation. They operate at a scale that 
few other actors can match, and they have experience 
in many roles in infrastructure finance, including making 
direct loans, creating targeted risk mitigation instruments 
and providing technical assistance. They have a key 
role in convening diverse stakeholders; mitigating and 
hedging risk; standardising data, measurement methods, 
projects and qualifications; providing policy support; and 
providing technical assistance for project development 
and financing. Existing activities require a concerted 
expansion. Cooperation among national development 
banks through the International Development Finance 
Club (IDFC)175 and the MDBs in tracking green finance 
and other best practices is an important start. Initiatives 
such as the Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance176 
offer valuable platforms for further cooperation between 
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governments and the private sector to scale up investment. 
At the same time, governments and regulators have a 
critical role to play in improving the risk-return profile for 
clean energy projects. The first step is to “level the playing 
field” by removing fossil fuel subsidies and implementing 
or strengthening carbon pricing policies. Other important 
mechanisms include stable clean energy subsidies and 
power purchase agreements that provide long-term revenue 
certainty for projects; designing electricity markets that 
do not expose low-carbon energy to fossil fuel price risk; 
reforming energy utilities and improving their credit ratings; 
and streamlining permitting and approval processes.177 
Making the most of renewables to expand modern 
energy access, meanwhile, will require not just scaling up 
technologies, but also “scaling out”: financing, policies and 
technologies to overcome existing barriers. New finance and 
distribution mechanisms need to be tailored to the costs and 
risk profiles associated with delivering these technologies 
to households, small businesses and other users – from 
solar PV to clean cookstoves and fuels, including where 
grid extension may be prohibitively costly.178 New players, 
such as the Infrastructure Development Company Limited 
in Bangladesh are pioneering successful approaches. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) proposal 
for a mini-grid pooling facility is also promising.179 A global 
fund for connectivity, as proposed by the African Progress 
Panel, could also be an effective vehicle.180 
If financing for clean energy were gradually raised to a global 
total of US$1 trillion a year in 2030, the analysis conducted 
for this report estimates that the additional low-carbon 
power supply and investment in energy efficiency could 
reduce annual global GHG emissions by around 5.5-7.5 Gt 
CO
2
e in 2030.
The Commission recommends that, to bring down the costs 
of financing clean energy and catalyse private investment, 
multilateral and national development banks scale up their 
collaboration with governments and the private sector, and 
their own capital commitments, with the aim of reaching a 
global total of at least US$1 trillion of investment per year in 
low-carbon power supply and (non-transport) energy  
efficiency by 2030.
Donors and development finance institutions should phase out 
the financing of high-carbon energy systems, except where there 
is a clear development rationale without viable alternatives. 
They should significantly increase financing for energy access, 
including a global fund for connectivity. National governments 
should commit to clear, stable policy and regulatory frameworks 
that properly reward clean energy and reduce risks. The private 
sector should work with governments and regulators to scale 
up the use of finance and industry models that lower financing 
costs for low-carbon energy and energy efficiency investment, 
particularly for institutional investors. Private investors should 
also consider expanding their own commitments to financing 
clean energy and shifting away from coal. 
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn 
is Zuckerman, J., Frejova, J., Granoff, I. and Nelson, D., 2015. 
Investing at Least a Trillion Dollars a Year in Clean Energy. A 
New Climate Economy contributing paper for Seizing the 
Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and a 
Better Climate. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.
report/misc/working-papers.
 
2.4  Raise energy efficiency standards 
to the global best 
The world’s energy systems have undergone an 
unprecedented expansion in the last 25 years, with energy 
demand growing by 50% to fuel an economy that has 
more than doubled in size.181 Efficiency is an essential 
component of any strategy to deliver affordable, reliable 
energy systems, with an abundance of opportunities to 
reduce demand and improve the use of energy resources at 
a lower cost than equivalent supply-side options. It is thus 
increasingly referred to as the “first fuel”.182 It can reduce 
the need to build new energy production infrastructure 
and, by reducing energy demand, it plays a key role in 
curbing GHG emissions from the energy sector. 
Greater energy efficiency can benefit countries at all stages 
of development, but particularly fast-growing economies 
trying to achieve universal energy access with limited 
resources. Yet many opportunities go untapped because of 
misaligned incentives, lack of information and other market 
failures. This makes energy efficiency standards particularly 
important. As part of a wider policy package, they can be 
an effective means of changing consumer and business 
behaviour, and driving product innovation. International 
cooperation can amplify the benefits by aligning and 
gradually raising efficiency standards around the world. 
Converging towards “global best” standards in key sectors 
such as appliances and lighting, vehicles, buildings and 
industrial equipment would unlock energy and cost savings, 
expand global markets, reduce non-tariff barriers to trade 
and reduce GHG emissions.
Substantial international efforts to improve energy 
efficiency are already under way. The International 
Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), 
the Clean Energy Ministerial, the UN Sustainable Energy 
for All (SE4All) initiative, and the Global Best Practice 
Networks, among others, are providing platforms for 
collaboration, working to analyse energy efficiency 
options, to design model policies and to identify finance 
mechanisms. Through the “en.lighten” initiative, led by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), more than 60 countries 
have committed to reduce inefficient lighting by 2016. The 
Global Fuel Economy Initiative is helping more than 20 
countries improve vehicle fleet efficiency. The IEA is also 
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playing a prominent role, through its Energy Efficiency 
Working Party and the Energy Technology Network, 
which covers all sectors including its Energy Efficient End 
Use Equipment (4E) initiative. SE4All has identified 168 
institutions and at least 145 initiatives around the world 
focused on energy efficiency.183 
The G20, in collaboration with these major international 
initiatives, could provide a powerful platform for expanding 
and accelerating action. In November 2014, the G20 
approved a plan for voluntary collaboration on energy 
efficiency, and IPEEC and other organisations are helping 
identify next steps for implementation.184 The G20 is 
strategically important because its members make up 80% 
of global energy consumption and dominate manufacturing 
and associated knowledge and capital. For example, 
94% of vehicles are produced in G20 countries, so G20 
action would have a major influence on uptake of efficient 
technologies worldwide.185 The G20 is thus particularly 
well-placed to enhance the diffusion and stringency of 
energy efficiency standards and raise performance in key 
markets. The November meeting of the G20 in Turkey 
offers a major opportunity to act.
Energy efficiency has huge economic value that is 
increasingly recognised. It can reduce fuel and energy bills, 
spur economic growth, and lead to reduced air pollution 
and GHG emissions. Modelling for the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) shows that the global uptake of 
economically-viable energy efficiency investments could 
boost cumulative economic output by US$18 trillion to 
2035. This has been assessed in macroeconomic models 
to increase growth by 0.25–1.1% per year, with associated 
increases in employment.186 Energy efficiency increases 
output because it frees up resources for other, more 
productive investments, which is why the IEA estimates 
that efficiency measures yield benefits up to 2.5 times the 
avoided energy costs.187
Some of these gains can be offset by the “rebound effect”, 
whereby consumers use part of the savings to buy more 
energy or other energy-using goods and services. Still, the 
overall benefits can be substantial. Between 1974 and 
2010, energy efficiency saved more energy in IEA member 
countries than was provided by any single supply-side 
resource.188 While 2010 energy use was 20% higher than 
in 1974, it would have doubled without energy efficiency 
measures. Energy efficiency is good for energy security as 
well. A more energy-efficient economy is less susceptible to 
supply disruptions or price shocks associated with volatile 
fossil fuel prices, and can serve to drive down energy 
prices.189
Finally, energy efficiency can reduce GHGs cost-
effectively;190 in fact, it is crucial for tackling climate change. 
To stay on a 2°C path, the IEA shows the energy-intensity 
of GDP would need to decline by 64% by 2050,191 meaning 
that if economic output triples, there would only be a 20% 
increase in primary energy use. Of the total energy-sector 
GHG reductions needed by 2050 for a 2°C pathway, the 
IEA envisions 38% coming from improved efficiency in 
end uses.192 As shown in Figure 7, there is great untapped 
Industry
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IEA projections to 2035 show that as much as two-thirds of energy 
eciency potential will remain untapped unless policies change.
Figure 7
Long-term energy efficiency economic potential by sector
Source: IEA, 2014.193  
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potential for energy efficiency across sectors.
Public policy has played a role in the reduction of energy-
intensity of GDP observed in the last 10 years, and a clear 
picture is emerging of best practices. Key components 
of a good “policy package” to overcome market failures 
and other barriers include “getting prices right” for 
energy (e.g. through carbon pricing and phasing out 
fossil fuel subsidies); providing incentives for innovation; 
providing information to overcome habitual choices and 
ease decision-making; providing effective financing; and 
regulation through energy efficiency standards.194
Countries vary significantly in their energy productivity 
(GDP per unit of energy used). Some variations are due to 
the different sectoral make-up of economies, and levels 
of development,195 but the wide divergence between the 
stringency of energy efficiency standards is also a key 
factor. This means that significant economic savings are 
going untapped in those countries where standards are 
lower. Unaligned standards also add greatly to transaction 
costs for firms trying to sell into different national markets. 
There are therefore strong economic grounds for 
countries to raise their standards over time, gradually 
converging towards the “global best”. This does not mean 
that all countries would have the same standards. There 
are likely to be differences for countries at different stages 
of development. Rather, the goal would be to converge 
toward a smaller number of standards.196 Adoption of 
these standards would be voluntary, and they could be 
applied in different ways. In some cases, countries may 
require all products to achieve a minimum performance 
level, such as for new buildings. In others, such as for 
domestic appliances, minimum energy performance 
standards can be set, but labelling products can also be 
important, allowing consumers to choose. The US Energy 
Star labelling scheme provides an example.197 Vehicle 
efficiency standards (such as in the US and EU) are often 
applied as an average across the range of models sold 
by individual manufacturers. In all cases an important 
principle is that standards should be subject to continuous 
improvement – the “global best” is not a static concept but 
a constantly evolving one. Japan’s “Top Runner” approach 
for appliances, for example, achieves this by basing future 
minimum standards in a given product class on the  
highest level of energy efficiency currently available.198
Any design process for convergence will need to include 
strong coordination between relevant governments, best 
practice networks, domestic and international regulators, 
and industry. And it should be open to the widest possible 
membership, as a basis for policy exchange, dialogue 
and lesson-learning. Enforcement of standards, which is 
essential, is often a challenge for countries with limited 
resources; here, exchange of good practice can provide 
vital assistance. Lastly, the approach to standards should 
be part of a coordinated policy package for energy 
efficiency. International efforts should also incorporate 
issues such as support for building effective governance 
systems, delivering upfront finance for energy efficiency 
investments, and providing information to consumers.199
The Commission recommends that G20 and other countries 
converge their energy efficiency standards in key sectors 
and product fields to the global best by 2025, and that the 
G20 establish a global platform for greater alignment and 
continuous improvement of standards. 
To support further action on energy efficiency, international 
organisations, with business and national governments, 
should work towards internationally accepted product 
definitions, metrics for energy efficiency, test protocols, and 
better information provision. Institutions such as IPEEC, IEA 
and SE4All can help in the collection of comparable data, 
policy analysis, and to advise countries on setting energy 
efficiency standards.
A programme of gradual convergence to global best 
standards in appliances, lighting, vehicles, buildings 
and industrial equipment could save 4.5-6.9 Gt CO
2
 in 
emissions by 2030, with significant financial savings and 
benefits to productivity.200
The full Working Paper from which this summary is 
drawn is Bishop, R., 2015. Raising Energy Efficiency 
Standards to the Global Best. A New Climate Economy 
contributing paper for Seizing the Global Opportunity: 
Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better Climate. 
Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/
working-papers.
2.5  Implement effective carbon 
pricing
A growing number of countries, sub-national governments 
and businesses are recognising the value of putting a price 
on carbon and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. They are 
cooperating internationally to overcome barriers to these 
reforms and to accelerate progress. 
A strong, predictable and rising carbon price – applied 
through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system – is a 
particularly efficient way to advance climate and fiscal 
goals.201 It sends important signals across the economy, 
helping to guide consumption choices and investments 
towards low-carbon and away from carbon-intensive 
activities.202 It can also raise fiscal revenues for productive 
uses. About 40 national and over 20 sub-national 
jurisdictions have now adopted or scheduled a price on 
carbon, covering an estimated 7 Gt CO
2
e, or about 12%  
of annual global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.203  
This is triple the coverage a decade ago but is far short  
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of what is required. 
In 2014 China launched two pilot regional emissions 
trading schemes (ETSs), bringing the total to seven; France 
and Mexico implemented carbon taxes; Chile approved a 
carbon tax, to start in 2018; and California and Quebec 
linked their cap-and-trade programmes. In January 2015, 
South Korea launched its ETS – one of the world’s largest 
– and Portugal enacted a carbon tax. In April, Ontario 
announced it will launch an ETS linked to the California 
and Quebec schemes. Next year, China plans to transition 
to a national carbon pricing system, and South Africa 
plans to introduce a carbon tax. The European Union is 
tightening its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).204 
After years of business opposition, many major companies, 
including in high-emitting sectors such as oil and gas, 
are now endorsing carbon pricing as well.205 They see it 
as a way to drive efficiency and profitable new business 
opportunities. More than 1,000 businesses and investors 
signalled their support for carbon pricing at the UN 
Climate Summit in September 2014, including BP, British 
Airways, Cemex, Braskem, Royal Dutch Shell, Statkraft, 
Unilever, Statoil and DONG Energy.206 In May, at the 
Business & Climate Summit 2015 in Paris, 25 global 
business networks representing more than 6.5 million 
companies called for “robust and effective carbon pricing 
mechanisms as a key component to gear investment and 
orient consumer behaviour towards low-carbon solutions 
and achieve global net emissions reduction at the least 
economic costs”.207 In addition, at least 150 companies in 
diverse sectors use an internal carbon price in assessing 
investments.208 Major oil companies such as Shell, BP, 
Exxon-Mobil and ConocoPhillips use a price of US$40  
per tonne of CO
2
e or more.209
The economic case 
The growing support for carbon pricing reflects a 
recognition that it is not only good climate policy, but also 
a useful way to raise government revenue – one that is 
less distorting than many existing taxes such as on labour 
and business activities. The Canadian province of British 
Columbia has used its carbon tax revenue, around 3% of 
the total budget,210 to lower income and corporate taxes 
and compensate low-income households. Quebec and 
California use their permit auction revenues to fund low-
carbon technology advancement. EU ETS auction revenues 
are used by Member States to fund innovation and climate- 
and energy-related activities, among other things.211 
The evidence on carbon pricing suggests that it is effective 
at reducing emissions without harming the economy. In 
the US, for example, the nine states that participate in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) have cut their 
UNION
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
ONTARIO
NEW BRUNSWICK
BRAZIL
EUROPEAN
SOUTH
AFRICA
CHINA
KAZAKHSTAN
NEW
ZEALAND
SWITZERLAND
CHILE
UKRAINE
TURKEY
Saitama
Tokyo
Kyoto
Shanghai
Shenzhen
São Paulo
LATVIA
Beijing
Tianjin
Chongqing
CALIFORNIA
OREGON
WASHINGTON
MANITOBA
QUÉBEC
PRINCE EDWARD
ISLANDNOVA
SCOTIA
HUBEI
GUANGDONG
FRANCE
MEXICO
THAILAND
JAPAN
ICELAND
IRELAND
NORWAY
SLOVENIA
ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation
Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation
ETS or carbon tax under consideration
ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled
ETS implemented or scheduled, carbon tax under consideration
Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration
KOREA,
REP.
U.K.
DENMARK
SWEDEN
FINLAND
PORTUGAL
ALBERTA
R.G.G.I. [Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative]
(Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachussets, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont)
Rio de Janeiro
Figure 8
Summary of existing, emerging and potential carbon pricing instruments (emissions trading 
schemes and tax). 
Source: World Bank, 2015.212  
42 www.newclimateeconomy.report
emissions by 18% and their GDP has grown by 9.2% in 
2009–2013. By comparison, emissions in the other 41 US 
states fell by only 4%, and their GDP grew by 8.8% over 
this same period.213 British Columbia’s carbon tax was 
increased from CD$5 in 2008 to CD$30 in 2012, and over 
this period helped to reduce per capita GHG emissions by 
about 10% (compared with a 1% reduction in the rest of 
Canada), without any adverse impact on GDP.214
 
Yet concerns that pricing carbon will hurt industrial 
competitiveness continue to restrain action. As a result, 
most explicit prices are still quite low, less than US$10 per 
tonne of CO
2
, and often without any mechanism or plan to 
increase them. Furthermore, a number of countries have 
provided exemptions or special treatment to their most 
polluting energy-intensive industries, thus limiting the 
effectiveness of the carbon price. 
International cooperation can help to overcome this 
barrier. Instead of pushing for border carbon adjustments 
(BCAs) to try to “level the playing field” between countries 
of differing climate ambition, trading partners can 
coordinate the introduction of carbon prices of roughly 
comparable levels to overcome competitiveness concerns. 
By working together, countries can also benefit from 
knowledge-sharing on best practice, greater transparency, 
and the opportunity to link trading schemes.
Equally important is to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, 
which are effectively negative carbon prices. Subsidies 
to fossil fuel consumption in emerging and developing 
economies totalled US$548 billion in 2013,215 while fossil 
fuel exploration, production and consumption support in 
OECD countries amount to US$55–90 billion a year.216 
Governments increasingly recognise that these subsidies 
are harmful to both the economy and the climate, and in 
the past two years alone, 28 have attempted reforms. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has classified 12 of 
these as successes (leading to a permanent and sustained 
reduction of subsidies), 11 as partial successes, and five as 
unsuccessful.217 International cooperation can help create 
a level playing-field across trade partners or in a region. It 
can also help disseminate knowledge about what works 
best. For example, phasing in reforms over several years, as 
part of a broader fiscal reform package, and using in-kind 
transfers to more directly support poor and vulnerable 
households and to ease the impact of reforms.218 
A prime opportunity to act 
Conditions are now particularly favourable for both 
carbon pricing and fossil fuel consumption subsidy 
reform, due to the fall in global oil prices over the last year, 
combined with lower gas and coal prices.219 While these 
low prices may not last, in the short-term they can help 
to offset the energy price increases resulting from these 
measures, making it easier for consumers and businesses 
to adjust and reducing political resistance.220 It is notable 
that a number of countries, including Mexico, India and 
Indonesia, have seized the opportunity to advance reform 
of fossil fuel subsidies over the last year. Many of these 
reforms are expected to be permanent.
G20 countries have already agreed to phase out inefficient 
fossil fuel subsidies, and several are now acting with 
support of international institutions such as the IMF, the 
IEA, the OECD and the World Bank.221 The Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies have made a 
similar commitment. Now is the time to build on these 
commitments and introduce meaningful explicit carbon 
prices across countries at the same time.
Governments that choose to act have considerable support 
available. The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, which 
brings together leaders from across government, the 
private sector and civil society, is working to increase 
knowledge on effective carbon pricing systems, and 
helping to define the business and economic case for 
carbon pricing.222 The World Bank Partnership for Market 
Readiness (PMR) has also helped to accelerate action, 
supporting countries in the preparation and implementation 
of carbon pricing instruments and other climate policies.223 
If carbon pricing were widely adopted around the world, 
rising to an average of US$50 per tonne of CO
2
 in 2030 
and including partial fossil fuel subsidy phase-out, the 
analysis conducted for this report estimates that global 
emissions could be reduced by 2.8-5.6 Gt CO
2
e. The 
economic benefits of these reductions, including the 
incentives for innovation and investment and efficiency 
from carbon prices, will drive a future of more sustainable 
and low-emissions growth.
The Commission recommends that all developed and 
emerging economies, and others where possible, commit to 
introducing or strengthening carbon pricing by 2020, and 
should phase out fossil fuel subsidies. 
Governments should integrate these measures into broader 
fiscal reform strategies, prioritising the use of resulting 
revenues to offset impacts on low-income households and 
other productive uses such as financing reductions in other 
distortionary taxes. Coalitions of willing governments 
should work together to enhance efficiency and minimise 
competitiveness impacts, building on existing peer-review 
processes to share knowledge, and reporting annually on 
progress. All major businesses should adopt internal carbon 
prices in their business strategies, and actively support 
carbon pricing policy.
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn 
is Rydge, J., 2015. Implementing Effective Carbon Pricing. 
A New Climate Economy contributing paper for Seizing 
the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and 
a Better Climate. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.
report/misc/working-papers.
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2.6  Ensure new infrastructure is 
climate-smart 
Infrastructure is a foundation for economic growth. 
Robust, efficient power grids, water and sewer systems, 
transportation systems and communications networks are 
essential to modern economies and societies. They shape 
our economies in profound ways, determining whether 
people drive, walk, cycle or ride public transit, whether 
we remain dependent on fossil-fuelled power or move 
towards renewables, and whether heavy downpours 
cause devastating floods or landslides, or storm water is 
efficiently channelled out to sea.224 
Emerging and developing economies face high demand 
for new infrastructure to support growing populations, 
increased consumption and new industry, and many 
also have major maintenance backlogs on existing 
infrastructure systems. Even in developed economies, 
much infrastructure is outdated and sometimes 
decaying due to chronic underinvestment.225 As Better 
Growth, Better Climate shows, around US$90 trillion in 
infrastructure investment is needed by 2030 to achieve 
global growth expectations.226 That is equivalent to 
around US$6 trillion per year, but current annual global 
investment is estimated at only around US$1.7 trillion. 
About 60% of the investment needed is in emerging and 
developing countries.
Most infrastructure assets last for 30–50 years or longer, 
so the choices made in the next 15 years, particularly 
about energy, transport and urban design, will shape the 
trajectory of economies for many decades. The challenge 
is thus twofold: to mobilise sufficient finance, and to 
ensure that infrastructure investments are chosen well 
to provide a foundation for sustained growth, prosperity 
and resilience. Getting these investments wrong will 
waste resources on assets which may not stand up to 
future climate change impacts, and exacerbate risks if they 
directly or indirectly lock in high emissions for decades. 
High-carbon investments may also increase dependence 
on price-volatile fossil fuels – and risk being devalued or 
stranded under future climate policies.
As shown in Figure 9, global aggregate infrastructure 
investment requirements to 2030 are projected to 
be around US$89 trillion. Shifting to low-carbon 
infrastructure would add about US$4 trillion in 
investments, an increase of less than 5%. The reason 
for the small increase is that the higher capital costs of 
investment in energy efficiency and low-carbon energy 
would be largely offset by capital savings from lower 
investment in fossil fuels, electricity transmission and 
distribution, and from a shift to better-planned and more 
compact cities. The additional upfront investment costs 
will of course need to be financed. But over their lifetimes, 
they could yield substantial savings – particularly from 
avoided fuel use – and other benefits that would largely 
offset any additional upfront capital investments. The 
case for ensuring that new infrastructure and upgrades 
alike are “climate-smart” – both climate-resilient and low-
carbon – is thus very strong.  
In recent years infrastructure investment has become a 
core focus of international economic cooperation, notably 
through the G20 and the development finance institutions 
(DFIs). The G20 established in 2014 a new Global 
Infrastructure Initiative, along with an implementing 
“Infrastructure Hub”, with the aim of catalysing both public 
and private investment.227 The World Bank now hosts 
the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF), a platform to 
facilitate the development of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) to mobilise private-sector and investor capital 
for infrastructure projects.228 The African Development 
Bank (AfDB) has established the Africa50 Infrastructure 
Fund, aiming to accelerate infrastructure development, 
and plans to raise US$3 billion in equity capital to begin 
operations.229 New multilateral and national development 
banks are being established with a specific infrastructure 
focus, notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB)230 and the New Development Bank.231 
Yet the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative largely 
ignores the close links between infrastructure investment 
and climate change, as do many national and local 
government planning processes: too often infrastructure 
and climate policies exist in separate silos. This creates 
potentially costly inconsistencies, sends mixed signals 
to investors, and heightens the risk of short-sighted 
infrastructure decisions. 
The importance of sustainable infrastructure for growth in 
developing countries makes it a priority for international 
financing, particularly by national and international DFIs. 
They can help to tackle market failures in the provision of 
private finance, for example by providing guarantees and 
other instruments to reduce policy or technical risks, by 
providing technical assistance and sharing best practices. 
As indicated in Section 2.3, there is a strong case for 
expanding the balance sheets and increasing the capital 
commitments of the multilateral development banks 
(MDBs), enhancing their capacity to mitigate risk and 
leverage greater private finance. 232  
International cooperation can also help mainstream climate 
into infrastructure investment, particularly through the 
DFIs. For example, several DFIs, including the World Bank, 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well 
as a number of bilateral finance institutions, are committing 
to halting unabated coal project financing. The MDBs have 
worked together for some years on how to shift their own 
investments and leverage other finance for climate-smart 
infrastructure, and continue to draw out lessons of good 
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practice, but this effort will need to extend to national 
development banks and the newer MDBs. Making best 
practices the norm, across all DFIs old and new, national 
and multilateral, will help ensure that all capital is deployed 
toward low-carbon investments. 
Progress is already being made: for example, the MDBs 
and the International Development Finance Club (IDFC),  
a network of national and sub-regional development 
banks, have agreed to work together to track and develop 
best practices for greening finance.234 Fully mainstreaming 
climate issues into infrastructure investments around 
the world will require rethinking policy and planning 
processes, overall and for individual projects. Approaches 
will need to be tailored to each country and financial 
institution, but should follow two high-level principles:  
• All infrastructure policies, plans, and projects should 
build in resilience to the risks of climate changes 
projected during their lifetimes.
• All infrastructure policies, plans and projects should 
be consistent with countries’ adopted climate targets 
and policies and long-term ambitions, and able to be 
justified in the context of the global long-term goal of 
holding average global warming to under 2°C. 
In particular, it would be sensible for the G20 to adopt 
these principles as part of its Global Infrastructure 
Initiative and its other related programmes, such as its 
Voluntary High-level Principles of Long-Term Investment 
Financing by Institutional Investors and in the work of the 
G20 Climate Finance Study Group.235 They would also be 
appropriate for adoption by DFIs, national development 
banks and sovereign wealth funds. And they could usefully 
steer the decisions of private investors, particularly those 
considering medium and long-term structural risk to 
project assets and portfolios, and those seeking ways to 
enhance long-term value creation.236
Integration of climate-smart principles into infrastructure 
decision-making needs to happen at three levels: in the 
design and alignment of overall strategy and policy, in 
the composition and balance of infrastructure plans 
and portfolios considered as a whole, and in relation to 
individual projects. Alignment of government policy is 
particularly crucial, as inconsistency between government 
policies inhibits investment and raises the cost of capital.237 
Once the overall strategic direction is set, a range of 
methods and instruments are available to mainstream 
climate at the project level.238 This needs to happen at 
the technical assessment stage, where technological and 
process options and alternatives are considered that 
will achieve the project aim; at the economic assessment 
stage, which involves measuring net impacts of the project 
on welfare; and at the financial assessment stage, where 
costs and revenues of the project are assessed.239 
The Commission recommends that the G20 and other 
countries adopt key principles ensuring the integration of 
climate risk and climate objectives in national infrastructure 
policies and plans. These principles should be included in 
the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative, as well as used 
to guide the investment strategies of public and private 
finance institutions, particularly multilateral and national 
development banks.
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Governments, development banks and the private sector 
should cooperate to share experience and best practice in 
mainstreaming climate into infrastructure policies, plans 
 and projects, including through the G20 Global 
Infrastructure Initiative.
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn 
is Rydge, J., Jacobs, M. and Granoff, I., 2015. Ensuring New 
Infrastructure is Climate-Smart. A New Climate Economy 
contributing paper for Seizing the Global Opportunity: 
Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better Climate. Available 
at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/working-papers.
2.7  Galvanise low-carbon innovation
Innovation is a fundamental engine of long-term 
productivity and growth,240 and is critical for delivering 
low-carbon growth in particular. As Better Growth, Better 
Climate highlights, advances in digitisation, materials 
science and biotechnology, along with new business 
models, have the potential to transform markets and 
dramatically cut resource consumption.241 For example, it is 
estimated that “circular economy” models, which minimise 
resource and energy use and maximise recycling, could add 
up to US$1 trillion to the global economy by 2025.242 But 
while existing technologies, widely applied, could achieve 
medium-term climate goals, more innovation is needed 
to support the transition to a 2°C pathway. International 
cooperation can help accelerate progress and spread the 
benefits of innovation around the world – particularly to 
emerging and developing economies. 
Important collaborations are already under way. In 
November 2014, the US-China Clean Energy Research 
Center was expanded to cover joint research on clean 
vehicles, building energy efficiency and clean coal.243 
The Low Carbon Technology Partnerships Initiative, a 
collaborative platform to accelerate diffusion of existing 
technologies and develop public–private partnerships 
(PPPs), was launched in May 2015.244 And since 1995, the 
International Energy Agency has increased the number 
of non-IEA members in its energy technology initiatives 
sevenfold.245 In agriculture, the Consultative Group for 
International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) is channelling 
about US$1 billion per year into RD&D to develop more 
productive and resilient crop varieties and to test improved 
agricultural techniques particularly suited to developing 
countries.246 Still, there is scope to do much more.
Innovation occurs through a complex ecosystem of actors, 
institutions, interconnecting networks and economic and 
social contexts, and at various stages in the life-cycle of 
technologies, from basic research to mass deployment. 
Within this system, investment in research, development 
and demonstration (RD&D) is particularly important for 
the development of new technologies and processes. 
Public spending support for research has long been 
recognised as economically justified, since it generates 
knowledge spillovers and benefits to society as a whole. 
But current levels of RD&D investment in energy and 
agriculture – the main sources of GHG emissions – are  
very low. 
Public funding for energy-related RD&D in IEA member 
countries was US$18.2 billion in 2013 – three-quarters of it 
for low-carbon technologies. This is more than 20% higher, 
in absolute terms, than in 2008,247 but as a share of GDP, 
energy-related RD&D is less than half what it was in the 
early 1980s.248 Private investment is similarly low.249 Global 
public funding for agriculture RD&D was US$32 billion in 
2008, and its share of overall public RD&D expenditure was 
only 3% in advanced economies.250 It is in this context that 
Better Growth, Better Climate calls for major economies to 
triple public energy-related RD&D spending, with the aim  
of exceeding 0.1% of GDP, and for a doubling of R&D  
in agriculture and agroforestry.251
Most innovation activity has historically been in advanced 
economies, which registered about 80% of climate-related 
patents in 2000–2011. 252 In 2013, they still accounted for 
about 74% of total RD&D in renewable energy.253 Activity 
in emerging economies is growing, however, particularly in 
China, which accounted for about 21% of global renewable 
energy R&D spending in 2013.254 India, Brazil, and to a 
lesser extent, Russia, Mexico and South Africa are also 
making substantial RD&D investments, mostly through 
state-owned enterprises. 
Not all countries need to be at the frontier of RD&D, 
but at the very least, they need to be able to adopt and 
adapt innovations developed elsewhere. However, 
innovation ecosystems vary widely across countries, with 
generally lower absorptive capacity in low- and middle-
income countries.255 This poses significant challenges for 
development, particularly for countries wishing to pursue 
low-carbon pathways. There is huge potential to “leapfrog” 
to new, clean technologies, but it requires sustained effort 
over many years to develop the innovation skills, institutions 
and knowledge networks to support innovation activities and 
technology uptake.256 
Investing in climate-related innovation would be particularly 
beneficial for emerging and developing economies, where 
emissions are growing most rapidly and climate vulnerability 
is particularly stark. Rather than belatedly adopting 
technologies developed elsewhere, often at significant 
expense, countries can seize the opportunity to develop 
their own, locally-adapted solutions, which can in turn help 
drive industrial production and economic growth, as well as 
cutting emissions and improving resilience. These solutions 
could also become valuable exports, and be shared with other 
developing countries as a form of South-South cooperation. 
46 www.newclimateeconomy.report
Public funding for RD&D is particularly needed in 
technologies which will be required to reduce emissions 
after 2030. The IEA describes the current status of all such 
low-carbon technologies as “off track”.257 A number of areas 
are in particular need of stronger RD&D effort:
• Agriculture and bioenergy, including, for example, 
improvements in climate-resilient seeds and livestock 
feed. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
is a key component of many emissions reduction 
scenarios in the second half of the century, but needs 
considerable further research effort.258
• Buildings and construction, including building 
envelope technologies, which are projected to deliver 
10% of cumulative energy emissions reductions 
between the IEA’s 6°C and 2°C scenarios by 2050.259 
• Electricity networks, including smart grid and energy 
storage technologies, where further RD&D is needed 
on the integration of supply and end-use technologies. 
There is also a major need for further research on using 
off-grid renewables and batteries to facilitate energy 
access in low-income countries.
• Transport systems, particularly in urban areas. The 
IEA projects that transport could provide 19% of 
cumulative energy emissions reductions between its 
6°C and 2°C scenarios by 2050.260
• Carbon capture, use and storage, which may be 
crucial in post-2030 mitigation efforts. Studies suggest 
that a major delay in its availability could increase 
total discounted mitigation costs by 138% to 2100.261 
The IEA projects that CCUS could provide 13% of 
the cumulative energy emissions required for a 2°C 
scenarios by 2050.262
International cooperation can enable countries to share 
costs and risks, link RD&D activities to early market 
formation, increase knowledge-sharing, combine global 
capabilities, and build capacity. International efforts may 
involve national innovation programmes directly supporting 
RD&D activity by overseas entities; direct bilateral 
collaboration (such as IEA Implementing Agreements); 
and intergovernmental or non-governmental programmes 
supporting international activity (such as the Climate 
Innovation Centres263). International cooperative efforts 
on public RD&D should aim to enhance and complement, 
rather than distort or displace, domestic public RD&D 
programmes and existing private sector efforts.
The role of the private sector is vital. It is private 
companies – mostly multinationals and early-stage 
investors – that currently drive most international 
cooperation. Overall data on RD&D shows that spending 
by multinational innovator companies outside their 
home countries264 accounts for at least 10–20% of 
private-sector RD&D activity. In the case of smaller high-
innovation countries, over 60% of their private-sector 
RD&D might come from foreign enterprises.265 This 
includes, among other things, setting up global networks 
of innovation centres, joint innovation projects or ventures 
between multiple firms in different countries, foreign 
investment by venture capital, and combinations of all of 
the above.
The private sector tends not to invest in lower-income 
countries, however. International innovation activities 
tend to be heavily concentrated in countries with mature 
innovation ecosystems and large short- to medium-term 
market potential. For example, around 90% of US companies’ 
overseas innovation activity is in Europe, Japan, Canada, 
China, Brazil and India.266 Cooperative mechanisms such 
as voluntary patent pooling, open-source innovation and 
open licensing agreements are therefore needed to enable 
the rapid diffusion of key low-carbon solutions, while still 
providing the private sector with incentives to innovate.267
Experience to date suggests a number of principles that 
should be incorporated into the design of new or existing 
international co-operative efforts on RD&D. Lessons from 
national RD&D efforts and initiatives such as CGIAR suggest 
that it is important to achieve sufficient scale to ensure the 
basic foundations of a robust innovation ecosystem. This 
includes priority-setting processes, systems for quality 
assurance and evaluation, and mechanisms for intellectual 
property management. Long-term commitments that build 
trusting, effective relationships are particularly important; 
the IEA energy technology initiatives suggest that decade-
long initial commitments may be needed. And strong public-
private partnerships are crucial. Technology “challenges”, 
where different technological solutions are sought to a 
general problem, may also be useful: an “Apollo” project for 
clean energy has recently been established, and there is 
clear potential for similar programmes in other key fields.268 
The Commission recommends that emerging and developed 
country governments work together, and with the private 
sector and developing countries, in strategic partnerships 
to accelerate research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) in low-carbon technology areas critical to post-2030 
growth and emissions reduction. This includes innovation 
in agriculture; in longer-term solutions such as bioenergy 
and carbon capture, utilisation and storage; and in ways to 
avoid lock-in of carbon-intensive infrastructure (buildings, 
electricity networks, transport systems). There is also a critical 
need for cooperation to target or adapt innovations  
to developing-country needs.  
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn 
is Eis, J., Gradwell, P. and Bishop, R., 2015. Galvanising Low-
Carbon Innovation. A New Climate Economy contributing 
paper for Seizing the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for 
Better Growth and a Better Climate. Available at:  
http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/working-papers.
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2.8  Drive low-carbon growth through 
business and investor action
Major businesses generate a large share of global 
greenhouse gas emissions: nearly 15% come from the 
largest 500 companies alone.269 Yet businesses also 
drive technological innovation and low-carbon economic 
activity. And while major companies and business 
associations previously often opposed climate policy – 
some still do – many now demand it. Most recently, at the 
Business and Climate Summit in Paris in May, business 
associations whose networks represent 6.5 million firms 
called for strong climate action and a new international 
climate agreement.270 
Companies are increasingly integrating climate change into 
their business and investment strategies. Tackling climate 
change is a huge business opportunity: the global market for 
low-carbon and environmental goods and services was  
estimated at US$5.5 trillion in 2011–12, and is growing 
at over 3% per year.271 Businesses are developing new 
products and services to seize this opportunity; identifying 
and addressing climate risks in their operations and supply 
chains; and reducing their GHG emissions. This is starting 
to happen across a variety of sectors, including energy-
intensive ones such as cement, chemicals, and iron and 
steel, where emissions are large and significant reduction 
poses undeniable challenges.272 
The corporate reporting initiative CDP 273 estimates that in 
2014, almost 1,400 companies reporting to it (59% of the 
sample) achieved an aggregate of 700 Mt CO
2
e of emissions 
reductions through implementation of more than 90,000 
projects.274 This is roughly equivalent to the 2012 emissions 
of France and the Netherlands combined.275 In the past such 
actions were generally motivated by the requirements of 
policy, corporate social responsibility, or the anticipation of 
future policies. But increasingly they are driven by a clear 
business case. 
Companies typically reduce their emissions by improving 
energy efficiency and adopting lower-carbon technologies, 
processes and operating methods. Such actions can unlock 
significant savings in energy, resource and fuel costs, and 
also boost productivity and innovation. Among the Fortune 
100, 53 companies reported saving a combined US$1.1 
billion in 2013 from energy efficiency, renewable energy 
and other emission reduction initiatives – an average of 
over US$10 million per company.276 In an analysis for the 
We Mean Business coalition, CDP found that in 2013, the 
global average internal rate of return (IRR) on low-carbon 
projects by companies reporting to them was 11%, though 
there was significant variation by country and investment 
type, with some much higher.277 Indeed, there is growing 
evidence that emissions reduction does not undermine 
profitability, and may even enhance it.278 The CDP Climate 
Leadership Index (made up of companies taking the 
strongest climate action) has outperformed the Bloomberg 
World Index of top companies by 9.1% over the past four 
years (see Figure 10).279 
CDP Leadership Index (US$)
Bloomberg World Index (US$)
SOURCE: Source: Adapted from CDP, 2014. 
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The CDP Climate Leadership Index (made up of 187 companies 
taking the strongest climate action) outperformed the Bloomberg 
World Index of major companies by 9.1% over four years. 
 
Figure 10
CDP Climate Leadership Index vs. Bloomberg World Index
Source: Adapted from CDP, 2014.280
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Shareholders, customers and other stakeholders are 
also pushing businesses to take climate action. A global 
survey in 2013 found more than 80% of asset owners and 
nearly 70% of asset managers viewed climate change as a 
material asset risk.281 Of the 2,345 companies reporting 
to CDP in 2014, 88% considered climate change a risk to 
their operations.282 In April and May 2015, shareholders of 
Shell and BP passed resolutions requiring the companies 
to report the actions they were taking in relation to 
climate change, including emissions management, asset 
resilience, research and development in low-carbon 
technologies, and support for public policy.283 
Yet there is much greater potential.284 A large share of 
major businesses around the world have yet to adopt 
emissions reduction targets and plans,285 and many of 
those that have are relatively limited in their ambition. 
Only a very small number of companies have set long-
term (2030 or later) targets which can be considered to 
be in line with a sectoral 2°C pathway.286 An analysis of 70 
of the world’s largest publicly listed corporate emitters, 
across the aluminium, cement, chemicals and electric 
utilities sectors, found that 21 had targets up to 2020 
which could be considered consistent with a 2°C sectoral 
pathway, but only 7 had targets to 2030 or later.287 
Twenty others had non-2°C or “irrelevant” targets, and 
the rest had none at all. It is clear that efforts need to 
be extended and ambitions raised if businesses are to 
achieve a low-carbon transformation. 
Raising businesses’ climate ambition
Most climate actions by businesses to date have been 
undertaken by individual companies acting alone. But in 
recent years, several business-led cooperative initiatives 
have emerged to set new norms and expectations for how 
businesses should respond to climate issues.
Some initiatives focus on establishing targets, or  
common commitments or standards. The GHG Protocol, 
for example, provides common international standards 
for business emissions reporting.288 The Science Based 
Targets initiative goes further, encouraging companies to 
set medium- and long-term emissions reduction targets 
consistent with a global 2°C trajectory. The initiative 
provides a rigorous methodology based on sectoral 
shares of total emissions, in order to give these targets 
independent credibility.289 Similarly, signatories to the 
RE100 initiative agree to source their electricity from 
100% renewable sources, with a clear time frame for 
reaching their goal.290 
In the finance sector, a growing number of initiatives aim 
to set standards for responsible behaviour. The Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI) includes around 1,400 
asset owners, investment managers and service providers 
representing more than half the world’s institutional 
investment capital. PRI members report having engaged 
more than 1,660 companies in around 60 countries, 
seeking improvement in environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) policies and practices, including carbon 
emissions disclosure, targets and corporate lobbying on 
climate policies. 
The market for investments including some form of 
ESG now represents around a third of all assets under 
management, and evidence and practice suggest that 
consideration of ESG factors can reduce risk and 
improve investment and business performance.291 
Under the Montreal Pledge, meanwhile, asset owners 
and investment managers commit to measuring and 
disclosing the carbon footprint of their assets. The aim 
is to have at least US$3 trillion of assets covered by the 
pledge by the end of 2015.292 More radically, the Portfolio 
Decarbonisation Coalition encourages asset holders to 
decarbonise their investment portfolios.293 
But individual business action is rarely sufficient to 
transform whole markets and sectors in a low-carbon 
direction. For this a critical mass of companies is needed to 
build economies of scale, shift demand, and advocate for 
consistent regulatory policies. A number of initiatives have 
emerged over recent years seeking to catalyse the low-
carbon transformation of specific sectors, value chains, 
technologies or products in this way. 
The Low Carbon Technology Partnerships initiative 
(LCTPi), for example, has brought together about 100 
companies to accelerate the development and deployment 
of low-carbon technologies in key fields. Some LCTPi 
action plans are focused on energy-intensive sectors, such 
as the Cement Sustainability Initiative, and in chemicals; 
others focus on technologies such as carbon capture 
and storage and advanced biofuels. The LCTPi involves 
dialogue with governments on removing policy barriers 
and the formation of public-private partnerships for 
research, demonstration and development.294
 
Similarly, the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 (TFA 
2020) aims to transform markets for key agricultural 
commodities, with producers, traders and consuming 
companies all committing to eliminate deforestation 
from their supply chains. The aim is to extend current 
commitments for palm oil to other commodities such 
as soy, beef, and pulp and paper.295 Under the Soft 
Commodities Compact of the Banking Environment 
Initiative, major banks representing 20% of the 
international financing of agricultural commodities 
are developing new financing solutions for sustainably 
sourced commodities.296
There is significant scope for such initiatives to be 
developed in other sectors, particularly among energy-
intensive industries and the oil and gas sector.297
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Wider attempts to transform the financial sector are also 
under way. The United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) Inquiry into a Sustainable Financial System is 
working with central banks and financial regulators to 
examine how the financial system as a whole can help 
support the low-carbon transition. It argues for an 
expansion of the scope of risk management to include 
climate factors, and mechanisms to facilitate the flow 
of capital into low-carbon investment. Through the 
Focusing Capital on the Long Term initiative, a group of 
major investors is proposing ways to reorient investment 
practices away from “short-termism”, through changes 
in asset manager contracts, benchmarking, evaluation 
and incentives and clear statements of investment 
beliefs.298 The Climate Bonds Initiative aims to drive the 
expansion of new financial instruments for low-carbon 
investments.299
These initiatives have been accompanied by a rise in 
business-led climate advocacy. New coalitions are calling 
for clear, long-term and stable low-carbon policy signals 
to guide investment and innovation. Formed in 2014, We 
Mean Business brings together seven global associations 
to amplify the business voice.300 At the UN Climate Summit 
last September, the Global Investor Coalition brought 
together 350 investors with combined assets of US$24 
trillion to call for stronger climate policy.301 Business 
advocacy could also play a crucial role, together with trade 
unions and community organisations, in working to ensure 
a just and efficient transition to a low-carbon economy, by 
helping affected workers and communities, for example in 
coal mining and energy-intensive sectors, to shift into new 
sectors of employment. 
It is too soon to know how successful these initiatives 
will be. But they offer the potential to shift the huge 
resources of business investment and innovation towards 
driving a low-carbon transition. More broadly, there is 
a need to engage businesses all around the world, not 
just in developed countries. The prize is to align business 
interests more closely with the requirements of a 2°C 
pathway, to drive deeper emissions reductions and  
expand low-carbon markets.
The Commission recommends that all major businesses 
adopt short- and long-term emissions reduction targets 
and implement corresponding action plans, and all 
major industry sectors and value chains agree to market 
transformation roadmaps, consistent with the long-term 
decarbonisation of the global economy. Financial sector 
regulators and shareholders should actively encourage 
companies and financial institutions to disclose critical 
carbon and environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
factors and incorporate them in risk analysis, business 
models and investment decision-making. 
The finance sector should expand long-term and responsible 
ownership and financing practices, and improve its 
capabilities, incentives, standards and rules in order to 
facilitate the decarbonisation of the global economy. 
Businesses should adopt common standards for measuring, 
reporting and verifying emissions data using best practice 
protocols, and include their results in integrated financial 
reports. Businesses should work to ensure that trade 
associations and other groups representing them do not act to 
block action on climate change, and speak out when they do. 
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn 
is Whittington, E., Bartlett, N., Chessum, C., Reuvers, S. 
and Jacobs, M., 2015. Driving Low-Carbon Growth through 
Business and Investor Action. A New Climate Economy 
contributing paper for Seizing the Global Opportunity: 
Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better Climate. 
Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/
working-papers.
2.9  Raise ambition to reduce 
international aviation and maritime 
emissions
Global aviation and maritime shipping combined produce 
about 5% of global CO
2
 emissions, and by 2050 their share 
is projected to rise to 10–32%.302 While domestic aviation 
and shipping are covered under national policies and 
emission inventories, emissions from international aviation 
and shipping, which make up a majority of emissions in 
each sector, are not.303 They need to be addressed through 
internationally coordinated policies, in order to ensure 
efficiency in these global markets and minimise potential 
competitiveness impacts. 
The UN governing bodies of these sectors, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
have both made efforts to adopt policies for reducing 
international emissions, for which they are responsible, 
since they were directed to do so 17 years ago through the 
Kyoto Protocol. But progress has been very slow. In 2013, 
the IMO set design efficiency standards for new ships, and 
ICAO is due to decide in 2016 on the implementation of a 
market-based measure to control emissions from 2020. 
Several cost-effective options are available for further 
reducing emissions from aviation and shipping, mainly 
from more efficient fuel usage. New aircraft technology 
and harmonised air traffic management systems also offer 
opportunities to continue lowering fuel costs in aviation. 
In shipping, it is estimated that taking full advantage of 
already available efficiency measures could save over 
US$30 billion in fuel costs each year for the industry and 
avoid 300 Mt CO
2
 per year by 2030.304 
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International aviation
Aviation is a major economic sector, central to trade and 
to growth for both developing and developed countries. 
Aircraft carry about 35% of world trade by value, although 
only 0.5% by volume.305 The airline industry is growing 
rapidly: revenue has doubled in the past decade, from 
US$379 billion in 2004, to US$733 billion in 2014,306 and 
passenger bookings are forecast to double to over 6.5 
billion by 2032.307
Aviation is also a major contributor to global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for 13% of fossil fuel 
use in transport and about 2% of global CO
2
 emissions.308 
International aviation consumed 142 Mt of fuel in 2010, 
producing about 448 Mt of CO
2
 emissions, up from 185 
Mt CO
2
 in 1990.309 Given the growing role of aviation in 
the global economy, trade and business, ICAO expects 
international aviation emissions to rise to 682–755 Mt 
CO
2
 by 2020.310 Further, aviation’s non-CO
2
 emissions at 
high altitudes exacerbate the impact on warming to 2-4 
times greater than that of CO
2
 alone.311
Controlling aviation emissions growth will not be easy, but 
it is crucial given the size of the sector’s emissions. On the 
demand side, there is a need to provide viable alternatives 
to flying – such as high-speed rail and wider use of 
communications technologies that reduce travel needs. 
Within the sector, the focus needs to be on improving fuel 
efficiency and shifting to cleaner fuels. 
Both domestic policy and ICAO-led international policy 
have a role to play in incentivising such changes. At the 
domestic level, several countries including Japan, Brazil 
and others have implemented jet fuel taxes for domestic 
flights, and Norway has levied a carbon tax on domestic 
aviation since 1991.312 In June 2015, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency took initial steps toward regulating 
aviation emissions.313 Emissions from flights within the EU 
are covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS),314 
but longstanding legal agreements, including the 1944 
Convention on International Civil Aviation and numerous 
bilateral agreements, have effectively prevented taxation  
of fuel for international aviation.315 
Fuel is a major cost for the industry: US$208 billion in 
2013, or 30% of total costs,316 so fuel efficiency measures 
are economically attractive. And there is considerable 
room for improvement: there was a 27% difference in 
the fuel efficiency of the least and most fuel-efficient US 
airlines in 2013.317
Fuel efficiency can be improved through improved 
infrastructure, operational measures such as reducing 
the weight of on-board equipment, and improved aircraft 
design and materials. “Winglets”, for instance – up-tilted 
wingtip devices that reduce aircraft drag – can cost over 
US$1 million per aircraft to install, but improve fuel 
efficiency by 4% and pay for themselves in about two to 
three years (depending on fuel cost).318 Beyond these 
types of improvements, however, further emissions 
reductions from aviation may be quite costly and options 
are limited. Some carriers are also testing specialised 
biofuels; as in other sectors, however, there are questions 
about biofuels’ life-cycle emissions, sustainability and 
cost-effectiveness. 
Policy action is needed to accelerate progress. While 
regulation through the EU or domestic policy is an 
option, acting through ICAO would ensure a harmonised 
approach across the sector globally, increasing coverage 
and reducing administrative burden. Yet ICAO has moved 
slowly since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol suggested it take 
action, drawing considerable criticism.319 At the 37th 
ICAO Assembly in 2010, governments set aspirational 
goals to improve fuel efficiency by 2% per year and make 
international aviation’s growth from 2020 onwards 
“carbon-neutral”, but these commitments are not binding 
and are unlikely to amount to the reductions needed for  
a 2°C pathway.320 
Through ICAO, governments, civil society and the industry 
are also developing a global CO
2
 standard for new aircraft to 
be agreed in 2016.321 The coverage of this standard has not 
yet been finalised. If only “new types” of aircraft are included 
under the standard, then just 5% of the global fleet would 
be covered by 2030. If all “new in-production” aircraft are 
included, fleet coverage would rise to 55% in 2030.322
These efforts are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the 
industry’s targets, however, so ICAO has also taken steps 
to establish a market-based measure  (MBM) to “bridge 
the gap” (see Figure 11). ICAO is due to take a decision on 
the measure in 2016, which would be fully implemented 
in 2020.323 Three options are currently being considered: 
an offset scheme in which carriers purchase permits or 
offsets to cover CO
2
 emissions above an agreed level; an 
offset scheme with revenue, applying a fee per unit traded 
and using the funds to assist developing countries with 
implementation, for example; or a global emissions trading 
scheme, which would cap total emissions from the sector, 
issue allowances for this amount, and distribute or sell 
them at auction to carriers.324 A simple offset scheme is 
favoured by some industry groups, and most discussions 
in ICAO are focused on it; but all three options remain on 
the table, and the potential to generate revenue makes the 
option two options particularly attractive.325 
An ICAO study found that an MBM to cap net emissions at 
2020 levels could require offsetting 464 Mt CO
2
 in 2036, 
roughly half of projected emissions. ICAO has estimated 
that if carbon prices rose from US$30 in 2020 to US$45 
in 2035, an MBM would only slow international aviation 
growth slightly, to 107% in 2020–2036, against a baseline 
of 110%.326 The additional cost to airlines would be US$10/
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seat for a long-haul flight of 10,000–12,000 kilometres, 
and US$1.50/seat for a short-haul flight of 900–1,900 km, 
with most models suggesting that almost all the cost would 
be passed on to consumers.328 Global industry profits in the 
year 2036 would be US$33.3 billion, US$0.4 billion lower 
than in a baseline scenario.329 
A key issue in the design of any MBM is its distributional 
impact – particularly how it will affect developing countries. 
ICAO decided in 2012 that any MBM should accommodate 
“the special circumstances and respective capabilities of 
developing countries”.330 One way of achieving this would be 
to provide financial support to affected low-income countries, 
or to only buy offsets from developing countries. Some have 
also suggested exempting some routes or countries. 
International shipping
International shipping carries about 90% of world trade by 
volume, on a fleet of more than 50,000 ships.331 Demand 
for maritime transport has risen significantly: total cargo 
on international seaborne trade grew from 2.6 billion 
tonnes in 1970 to 9.5 billion tonnes in 2013.332 Emissions 
from shipping have also increased sharply, to 949 Mt CO
2
 
in 2012, or 2.7% of global CO
2
 emissions, up from 1.8% in 
1996.333 By 2050, the IMO projects that CO
2
 emissions 
from shipping will rise by 50–250%.334 
Because of the global nature of shipping, international action 
is essential for effective regulation. A ship can be owned 
by a company based in one country, registered in another, 
and operated out of a third.335 Because shipping companies 
operate in so many different countries, the transaction cost 
of having different policies in different states would also be 
prohibitively high. However, IMO has made little progress 
thus far. 
Virtually all GHG emissions from shipping arise from the 
fuels used in ship engines.336 Shipping consumes 250–325 
Mt of fuel per year,337 about 85% of which is heavy fuel oil 
(HFO).338 Shipping is generally more efficient in terms of 
emissions than other forms of transport, but ship efficiency 
varies widely based on design, fuel and power sources, and 
operations.339 Even ships with similar designs can operate 
with vastly different efficiencies340 – the most efficient 
crude oil tanker is about one-fifth as fuel-intensive as the 
least efficient.341 
Key drivers of operational efficiency are speed (a 10% 
slower speed reduces fuel use per hour by 27%342) and 
utilisation rate – fully loaded ships are most efficient. 
Reliable data on operational efficiency are scarce, however, 
which remains a significant challenge. Design efficiency, 
meanwhile, depends on ship size, shape, capacity, power and 
other technical features.343 It has declined by about 10% 
in new ships since 1990, in part because high freight rates 
encouraged more block-like, less hydrodynamic designs, but 
began improving again in 2008.344 
Fuel represents 50% or more of a ship’s operating cost, 
and there are several cost-effective ways to increase fuel-
efficiency.345 For example, polishing propellers more often 
can increase efficiency by 4%, and costs just US$13 per 
tonne of fuel saved (at US$300–800 per tonne).346 One 
company has found that a fouling-resistant hull coating 
applied to a bulk cargo vessel at a cost of US$360,000 
saved about 5,400 tonnes of fuel over nine years, a 22% 
efficiency improvement.347 At a fuel cost of US$300 per 
tonne, the technology would fully pay itself back in just over 
two years, and over US$1.2 million would be accrued in net 
savings over nine years. 
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Two systemic market failures have kept the industry from 
embracing and rewarding energy efficiency measures.348 
First, there is little reliable information on ship efficiency 
and the expected gains from different technologies 
and operational measures. Second, incentives are split 
between the ship owner and charterer. Though individual 
contracts vary, ship charterers often bear some or all of 
the fuel costs, while the owner is responsible for the ship’s 
technology and design. Fully embracing available efficiency 
measures could significantly reduce the sector’s emissions, 
as illustrated in Figure 12 below.
Several independent initiatives have emerged to address 
the lack of transparency around fuel efficiency of ships in 
the industry, to enable charterers to inform their choice 
of carriers with information on expected fuel costs. For 
example, the organisations RightShip and Carbon War 
Room provide a public rating system of over 70,000 
vessels that grades each ship on design efficiency.349 The 
Clean Shipping Index provides a similar service, rating 
carriers on all pollutants, including NO
X
, SO
X
, particulate 
matter, chemicals, and on-board waste.350 However, 
these voluntary initiatives do not yet have full industry-
wide influence, and they lack a single, standardised 
methodology for evaluating efficiency. 
Tailored financing schemes to support energy efficiency 
investments have also emerged, including the Sustainable 
Shipping Initiative’s Save As You Sail (SAYS) and the Self-
Financing Fuel-Saving Mechanism (SFFSM) driven by 
Carbon War Room and University College London.351  
In both models, a third-party financier pays for the 
upgrades, and the cost savings are shared between the 
third party, owner and charterer (depending on who is 
paying for the fuel). 
The IMO has declared that shipping “will make its fair and 
proportionate contribution” towards achieving global 
climate change mitigation goals.352 It has adopted two key 
approaches: the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), 
which requires new ships built from January 2013 to meet 
an efficiency standard that will be raised over time,353 and 
the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), a 
tool that ships are required to use to identify energy-saving 
measures (though they are not required to adopt them).354 
The EEDI and SEEMP are expected to save an average of 
US$200 billion in fuel costs and 330 Mt CO
2
 annually by 
2030 at marginal cost in the near term.355 
Still, these policies are not enough to stem the rapid growth 
in shipping emissions due to increased transport demand.356 
Several additional policy proposals were submitted to 
the IMO in 2010, including an emissions offset scheme, a 
fuel tax, and mandated energy efficiency targets, but they 
have not been taken up. In May 2015 the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands – the third-largest flag registry in the world 
– submitted a proposal to the IMO’s Marine Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC) for the adoption of a global 
emission reduction target.357 However, the Committee 
decided to focus instead on finalising the emissions data 
collection system. 
1500
1000
500
0
2000
2020 2030 20402010
Without 
Baseline (with EEDI standards)
improvement above EEDI standards
If the entire fleet achieved the eciency of 2011’s industry leaders by 2035, shipping’s 
total emissions could decrease while shipping activity doubles.
Figure 12
International shipping fleet CO
2 
emissions scenarios (Mt/year)
Source: ICCT, 2013.358
53SEIZING THE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY: PARTNERSHIPS FOR BETTER GROWTH AND A BETTER CLIMATE
Given the constraints that have hindered take-up of 
cost-effective efficiency measures to date, there are 
strong grounds for the IMO to adopt operational 
efficiency requirements that apply to all ships. These 
could be complemented by a trading scheme that would 
permit highly efficient ships to sell their extra “efficiency 
credits” to less efficient ships. These requirements would 
need to be ramped up over time to motivate continual 
improvement and adoption of cutting-edge technologies. 
The Commission recommends that emissions from the 
international aviation and maritime sectors be reduced in line 
with a 2°C pathway through action under the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to implement a market-
based measure and aircraft efficiency standard, and 
through strong shipping fuel efficiency standards under the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
ICAO should take a decision in 2016 to start implementation 
of a market-based measure (MBM) from 2020, which can be 
ratcheted up and has the potential to raise revenue which 
could support climate action or other priorities. It should 
also introduce in 2016 a stringent aircraft CO2 standard. 
Governments and airlines should also make further efforts to 
develop and expand the use of sustainable biofuels. An MBM 
could reduce in-sector emissions by 0.2–0.3 Gt CO2e per 
year in 2030.
The IMO should adopt a global emission reduction target. 
To increase use of cost-effective fuel-saving technologies 
and practices, the IMO should create a transparent, global 
system to provide reliable data on operational efficiency, and 
accelerate the process to establish ambitious operational 
efficiency standards for all ships. Charterers, banks and ports 
should incorporate fuel efficiency considerations within their 
operations, thereby creating incentives for more efficient ships. 
Broad adoption of these measures could reduce emissions by 
0.4–0.6 Gt CO2e per year by 2030.
The full Working Paper from which this summary is drawn 
is Gençsü, I. and Hino, M., 2015. Raising Ambition to Reduce 
International Aviation and Maritime Emissions. A New 
Climate Economy contributing paper for Seizing the Global 
Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better 
Climate. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/
misc/working-papers. 
2.10  Phasing down the use of 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are the fastest-growing group 
of greenhouse gases in much of the world, with emissions 
of major HFCs rising by 10–15% per year.359 Developed 
to replace chemicals being phased out under the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
they are used as refrigerants in air conditioners and other 
products, to make insulating foams, and as solvents. They do 
not harm the ozone layer, but are potent greenhouse gases, 
with particularly large near-term climate impacts.360
Developed countries already include HFCs in national 
emissions inventories under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
But to catalyse rapid action and mobilise finance, more 
than 100 countries now support amending the Montreal 
Protocol to phase down the production and use of HFCs 
with the highest climate impact. Such a phase-down 
could avoid 1.1–1.7 Gt CO
2
e of HFC emissions per year 
by 2030,361 while driving significant energy efficiency 
improvements with both economic benefits through 
energy savings and climate benefits. The Montreal 
Protocol includes a Multilateral Fund which could help 
finance HFC phase-down in developing countries. 
Momentum on HFCs is also building at the national 
level and in the private sector. The EU, the US and China 
have all committed to controlling HFCs more stringently 
and increasing the availability of alternatives. A diverse 
group of governments, businesses and others is tackling 
HFCs through the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to 
Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC). The 
Consumer Goods Forum, with more than 400 member 
companies, will start phasing out HFCs in refrigeration 
in 2015.362 Refrigerants, Naturally! – an initiative by 
Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Red Bull, Unilever and others – is 
working to eliminate the use of HFCs in those companies’ 
operations.363 
Driving these actions is a strong sense of urgency. The 
HFCs now used as substitutes for ozone-depleting 
substances (ODSs) can trap 100–4,000 as much heat in the 
atmosphere over 100 years, per tonne, as CO
2
.364 And while 
proper handling and disposal can reduce emissions, every 
HFC-using device is a small “bank” of potential emissions for 
decades to come. Without fast action, the climate impact of 
HFCs could grow as much as 30-fold by 2050,365 eroding 
the benefits of global mitigation efforts.
Moreover, phasing down HFCs with high global warming 
potential (GWP) would cost relatively little. The US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that 
HFC emissions could be reduced by more than 40% in 2030 
through measures that are cost-effective today.366 
Though in some areas (e.g. medical and technical aerosols, 
fire protection applications), there are still no good 
alternatives to high-GWP HFCs, in most areas they are 
widely available and affordable.367 The drinks manufacturer 
Heineken, which now uses non-HFC refrigeration where 
technically and legally feasible (about two-thirds  
of units worldwide), found HFC-free units cost about 15% 
more at first, but the price difference has narrowed as 
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larger numbers were purchased. The new units are also 
38% more energy-efficient than conventional ones, of which 
10–15% is due to the refrigerant (hydrocarbons), and the 
rest to technological improvements.368 Coca-Cola, which 
had installed 1 million HFC-free coolers as of January 2014, 
reports a 40% improvement in its cooling equipment energy 
efficiency since 2000.369 Recent low-GWP refrigerant 
demonstration projects presented by the CCAC calculated 
energy savings of 15–30% and carbon footprint reductions 
of up to 60–85% for refrigeration in food stores.370
Overall, about 55% of HFCs used in 2010 were in 
residential, commercial and industrial refrigeration and 
air conditioning; another 24% were in mobile (vehicle) 
air conditioning; 11% in foams; 5% in aerosols; 4% in fire 
protection systems; and 1% in solvents.371 As in the food 
and beverage industry, HFC-free equipment in other 
sectors has been found to be more energy-efficient, 
reducing costs and GHG emissions.372
For motor vehicle air conditioning, for example, the 
replacement chosen by most automakers supplying EU, 
Japanese and North American markets costs about US$100 
more per unit initially, and another US$2 each year. But the 
units save an estimated US$37–48 in fuel each year, paying 
for themselves in less than three years.373 Preliminary 
estimates by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBNL) also suggest that combining technically available 
energy efficiency improvements in room AC systems with 
a transition to low-GWP refrigerants would yield greater 
GHG emissions reductions than either measure alone.374 In 
India, the energy savings would be enough to avoid building 
120 medium-sized power plants in the next 15 years.375 
The Montreal Protocol has several advantages that 
would allow Parties to quickly and efficiently implement 
effective controls for HFCs, including a well-established 
infrastructure, expert panels, institutional experience 
phasing down nearly 100 similar chemicals, and dedicated 
implementation tools, including the Multilateral Fund.
The idea to bring HFCs under the Montreal Protocol 
was first proposed in 2009 by low-lying island states. 
Four proposals are now on the table, submitted by the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the Philippines, and six 
other island states; jointly by Mexico, Canada and the 
United States; by the European Union; and most recently 
by India, reversing its previous opposition. All focus on 
reducing HFC production and consumption under the 
Montreal Protocol, and leave accounting and reporting  
of HFCs under the UNFCCC.
The 2015 North American proposal suggests a staged 
phase-down, with developed countries starting right away 
and developing countries being given a 10-year grace 
period, as was done with ozone-depleting substances.  
This measure could avoid an estimated 94–115 Gt CO
2
e  
of cumulative HFC emissions by 2050.376 
A key strategy for slowing and reversing the growth in 
HFCs is to help countries that are currently phasing out 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) under the Montreal 
Protocol to “leapfrog” over high-GWP HFCs and move 
directly to available low-GWP alternatives where feasible. 
Leapfrogging HFCs in the phase-out of HCFCs would 
be considerably less expensive than a conversion first 
from HCFCs to HFCs and then from HFCs to low-GWP 
alternatives. Combining this with energy efficiency 
improvements would provide added climate benefits – and 
cost savings – from reduced energy use.377 
In April 2015, the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) 
of the Montreal Protocol held an extraordinary meeting 
on HFCs, where countries agreed “to study the feasibility 
and ways of managing HFCs”, with a view to establishing a 
Contact Group at the OEWG meeting scheduled for 20–24 
July in Paris. If progress continues, an HFC amendment 
could be adopted as soon as the Meeting of the Parties in 
Dubai in November 2015.
The UNFCCC could further speed the phase-down of 
high-GWP HFCs by encouraging Parties to include an 
HFC phase-down in their “intended nationally determined 
contributions” (INDCs) to the Paris climate agreement.378 
The Parties could also extend HFC reporting and 
accounting requirements to developing countries. 
The Commission recommends that the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol approve an amendment to phase down 
the production and use of HFCs.
Countries that do not yet have regulations in place 
for phasing down HFCs should begin developing and 
implementing such regulations alongside appliance energy 
efficiency standards. Major companies should commit to 
phasing out HFCs through cost-effective cooperative action 
programmes such as those of the Consumer Goods Forum 
and Refrigerants, Naturally!. The UNFCCC should encourage 
countries to include HFC phase-down in their INDCs and 
extend HFC reporting to all countries.
 
The full Working Paper from which this summary is 
drawn is Borgford-Parnell, N., Beaugrand, M., Andersen, 
S. and Zaelke, D., 2015. Phasing Down the Use of 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). A New Climate Economy 
contributing paper for Seizing the Global Opportunity: 
Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better Climate. 
Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/
working-papers. 
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